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The Measure of a Justice: 
Justice Scalia and the Faltering 
of the Property Rights Movement 
Within the Supreme Court 
RICHARD J. LAZARUS* 
Commentators generally evaluate Supreme Court Justices based on 
their votes in individual cases, especially the consistency of their voting 
records over time. Justices are also most closely identified by the 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions that they author although, 
ironically, the most significant of the three-the majority opinions-are 
the least likely to reflect the actual views of the authoring Justice in all 
respects. Majority opinions are formally dubbed "Opinions of the Court" 
for a reason. The single Justice assigned responsibility for crafting the 
majority opinion is not charged with simply detailing his or her own 
personal views. Quite the opposite. The Justice instead has the far more 
challenging job of crafting the views of a majority of the Justices. To do 
so frequently requires that the author of the opinion for the Court shed 
her own views on one or more aspects of the case. That is why it is a 
classic mistake for an advocate before the Court to refer to a majority 
opinion by a specific Justice as that Justice's opinion as though the 
opinion expresses the Justice's own personal views. Advocates who do so 
at oral argument run the risk of being immediately stopped short by the 
* Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Supreme Court Institute, Georgetown University Law 
Center. I would like to thank Kelly Falls, Georgetown University Law Center Class of 20fYl, for her 
excellent research and editorial assistance, and Georgetown Law Students JR Drabick, Seth Northrop 
(Class of 2006) and Abby DeShazo (Class of 20fYl), for their outstanding assistance in reviewing the 
papers of Justice Blackmun. This Article has benefited greatly from comments received on earlier 
drafts from John Echeverria, Tim Dowling, and Professors Peter Byrne, Tom Merrill, and Mark 
Tushnet, and Dean Bill Treanor. I served as counsel of record or co-counsel for parties or amicus in 
many of the regulatory takings cases discussed in this Article, including Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 
(2001); Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 
U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); 
and Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The views expressed herein are mine alone and do 
not necessarily represent those of my clients in any of those cases. 
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very Justice whose name they invoked to curry favor, but who instead 
admonishes the attorney that it was the Court's opinion.' 
It is, moreover, the ability of a Justice to craft such a majority 
opinion that is ultimately the most important and least understood of the 
skills that distinguish between ordinary and truly extraordinary jurists. 
The Justice who is able to do so is the one most likely to produce Court 
opinions that, because of their persuasive force, promote the kind of 
public respect ultimately necessary for the Court's authority. They are 
the majority opinions also most likely to have staying power over time. A 
Justice less skilled in the crafting of majority opinions, by contrast, is 
more likely to lose the majority present at conference when the Justices 
initially voted on the case, producing a splintering of the Court expressed 
in a rash of separate concurring and partially dissenting opinions. The 
upshot is that the Justice may have remained very true to her own deeply 
held convictions, but at the expense of producing opinions of the Court 
that announce rulings of law that meet the test of time. 
The Court's October Term 2004, along with the publication of the 
papers of Justice Harry Blackmun (The Blackmun Papers) in the spring 
of 2004,2 provide an opportunity to assess the ability of one of the current 
Justices to promote Court opinions in an area of law centrally important 
to him. Justice Antonin Scalia's arrival on the Court twenty years ago in 
September 1986 coincided with a major strategic effort by advocates of 
stronger constitutional protections of property rights to enlist the 
Supreme Court in support of their cause. While it is far from clear that 
property rights protections had previously been one of Justice Scalia's 
primary concerns, he quickly championed those interests on the Court 
and, with the arrival of Justice Clarence Thomas only five years later, the 
property rights movement had good reason to be optimistic. Justice 
Scalia appeared to have the makings of a solid majority on the Court that 
he could use to produce a series of rulings based on the Fifth 
Amendment's Taking Clause that limited government's ability to 
interfere with private property rights, especially in land and other natural 
resources. 
No such significant legal precedent favoring property rights, 
however, has resulted. The property rights movement has instead 
I. See CLERK OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, GUIDE TO COUNSEL IN CASES TO BE ARGUED 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (October Tenn 2004) ("Do not refer to an 
opinion of the Court by saying: 'In Justice O'Connor's opinion.' You should say: 'In the Court's 
opinion, written by Justice O'Connor."'). 
2. The papers of Harry A. Blackmun, lawyer, judge, and Associate Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court were given to the Library of Congress by Justice Blackmun in 1997, with the 
understanding that they would not be made generally available to researchers at the Library of 
Congress until five years after his death. The papers became available in March 2004. See Linda 
Greenhouse, Documents Reveal the Evolution of a Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at AI. The papers 
are referred to hereinafter as "The Blackmun Papers." 
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recently suffered several losses in the Supreme Court, culminating in 
spring 2005 with substantial defeats in all three property cases then 
before the Court. 3 While no single Justice is likely to be the primary 
cause of such a legal trend over several decades, the Blackmun Papers 
provide support for the proposition that Justice Scalia may well be partly 
responsible for the property rights movement's surprising lack of success. 
They reveal a Justice not only failing to craft majority opinions for the 
Court with persuasive staying power, but one who instead repeatedly 
alienated over time the individual Justices with whom he needed to forge 
a stable, workable majority favoring constitutional protection of property 
rights. His penchant for bright line per se tests4 favorable to takings 
plaintiffs ultimately had no legs within the Court.5 As applied to 
regulatory takings, the resulting analytic framework proved both 
incoherent and hard to square with any of the other competing themes of 
judicial conservatism within the Court: originalism and federalism. And, 
as applied to the other Justices, it prompted Scalia likewise to use a 
bright-line approach in condemning those moderate and conservative 
Justices on the Court who failed to follow his lead. Justice Scalia 
steadfastly refused to embrace the kind of balancing approach favored by 
potential allies, especially Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, and 
therefore lost the opportunity to produce significant precedent that 
might have aided property rights advocates far more than the narrowly 
drawn per se rules that Scalia personally favored. 
Justice Stevens, by contrast, appears to have succeeded against high 
odds where Justice Scalia has not, resulting in a series of rulings more 
favorable to government regulators in property rights cases. Once 
seemingly relegated to the role of the iconoclastic separate dissenter, 
with the arrival of Justice Scalia and then Justice Thomas, Justice Stevens 
has become the most influential member of the Court in property rights 
cases as he proved willing to embrace a more contextual analysis that he 
once rejected and, unlike Scalia, to join with those on the Court whose 
views he did not entirely share. 
The purpose of this Article is to take the measure of Justice Scalia's 
ability to produce significant opinions for the Court, rather than just for 
. himself, by focusing on the Court's property rights cases during the past 
several decades. Much of the analysis will rely on the Blackmun Papers, 
because they provide a virtual treasure trove of information revealing the 
Court's deliberative process while Blackmun was on the Court from 1971 
3. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County 
of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
4. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. II7S (1989); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court I99I Term Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 
106 HARv. L. REV. 22,65-66 (1992). 
5. See infra Part III. 
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to 1994. Almost all of this information, including Justice Blackmun's 
handwritten notes on what each Justice said at the Court's private 
deliberations and initial voting on the cases at conference, has never 
before been revealed and analyzed. 
The Article is divided into three Parts. Part I briefly describes the 
scope, content, and organization of the Blackmun Papers. Part II 
describes what happened behind the curtain in each of the many 
property rights cases before the Court between 1971 when Justice 
Blackmun joined the Court and 1994 when he resigned. The discussion 
covers the Court's regulatory takings precedent both immediately before 
Justice Scalia joined the Court and during the time that Justices 
Blackmun and Scalia served together on the Court. It includes a 
discussion of what was at stake in each case, what the Justices said at 
conference, how they initially voted, and then how the actual opinion of 
the Court evolved prior to its final publication. Finally, Part III offers a 
broader assessment of Justice Scalia's effectiveness in moving the Court's 
jurisprudence in a direction favoring greater constitutional protection of 
property rights. This final analysis extends in time beyond Blackmun's 
tenure on the Court to include the property rights cases since decided by 
the Court. 
I. THE PAPERS OF JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Justice Harry A. Blackmun served on the Supreme Court from 1971 
until 1994, leaving the bench soon after the Court announced its final 
opinions in June 1994 for October Term 1993. During his entire life, 
including his years on the Court, Justice Blackmun kept detailed records 
and notes on all aspects of his personal and professional life. The Official 
Library of Congress Register of the Blackmun Papers, which simply 
describes in the most general terms the contents of the Papers, is itself 
362 pages long.6 Not only did he maintain a diary and keep copies of 
personal and professional correspondence and speeches,7 he kept an 
amazing array of records of his life's activities: his "mechanical 
drawings"g and report cards and grades in high school,9 his "financial 
papers" from 1925 to 1932,10 "dance cards" during his college days at 
Harvard,'[ and even his notebooks for each of his classes at Harvard Law 
School. [2 The Blackmun Papers, publicly available in the Library of 
6. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun-A Register of his Papers in 
the Library of Congress (2003) (prepared by Connie L. Cartledge with the assistance of others) 
[hereinafter The B1ackmun Papers Register). 
7. [d. at 3-8. 
8. See The BJackmun Papers Register, supra note 6, Container 7. 
9. [d. 
10. See The Blackmun Papers Register, supra note 6, Container I. 
I I. [d. 
12. [d. at Containers 1-5. 
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Congress as of March 2004, extend to 1,576 containers of meticulously 
organized files. 13 
For scholars interested in the work of the Supreme Court, the 
Blackmun Papers relating to his years on the Court are extraordinary.14 
For each of the hundreds of cases heard by the Court on the merits 
during Justice Blackmun's tenure, there are documents revealing of not 
only the deliberations within his own chambers, but also the thinking of 
the other Justices. Documents for each case heard on the merits include: 
• Case docket sheets showing how every individual Justice 
voted on every case at both the jurisdictional stage and on the 
merits, and the subsequent assignments of opinion writing 
within the Court; 
• Memoranda at the jurisdictional stage written either by 
Blackmun's own clerks or the clerks of other chambers 
concerning whether the Court should grant review in a 
specific case; 
• Bench memoranda written by one of the Justice's clerks in 
anticipation of oral argument in the case, summarizing the 
briefs, discussing the merits, and proposing possible questions 
to be posed at oral argument; 
• B1ackmun's pre-oral argument notes prepared by Justice 
Blackmun himself (typically handwritten) immediately before 
the oral argument, in which he would outline his initial 
thinking about a case, his likely vote, and sometimes also his 
prediction of how the Court as a whole might vote; 
• Oral argument notes taken by the Justice during oral 
argument, which included brief discussion of substantive 
points made at argument, but also included references to the 
age, law school, and distinct physical characteristics of each 
advocate, along with a letter or numerical grade of the quality 
of their advocacy; 
• Conference notes taken by the Justice during the Court's 
private conferences during the weeks of oral argument, when 
the Justices would, without any other persons present, discuss 
the cases together and cast their votes (Blackmun wrote down 
what each Justice said during the conference as well as their 
votes); 
• Draft majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions prepared 
within Blackmun's own chambers and by other chambers, 
often with Blackmun's notations and comments on the drafts; 
13. S"" The Bl.or1<:mun Paoers Rel!ister. supra note 6. 
14. New York Times reporter Linda Greenhouse, who received early access to the Blackmun 
Papers, has published an outstanding book that considers what the papers reveal about Justice 
Blackmun's evolution on the Court, especially as it relates to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and his 
longstanding personal relationship with Chief Justice Warren Burger. See LINDA GREENHOUSE, 
BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY (2005). 
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• Opinion clerk memoranda prepared by Justice Blackmun's 
clerks for the Justice, commenting on the draft opinions of 
other chambers and recommending their modification; and 
• Opinion Justice Correspondence between Justices concerning 
circulating draft opinions. In such correspondence, a Justice 
typically notifies the Justice authoring the opinion of a 
decision to "join" the opinion, to request changes in the draft 
opinion, often as a condition of joining the opinion, or to 
prepare a dissent or concurring opinion or to await the 
preparation of a dissent or concurrence by another Justice. 
All of this information is very revealing of the Court's deliberative 
process, but no doubt the most remarkable are Justice Blackmun's notes 
taken during the conference on what each Justice said. The conference is 
the Court's most confidential proceeding. Only the Justices are in 
attendance. No other Court personnel, including the Justices' own law 
clerks, are allowed to attend. Justice Blackmun's notes, moreover, 
purport to be verbatim quotes of what each of the other Justices said in 
conference. (He did not, no doubt for logistical reasons, write down what 
he said at conference.) Justice Blackmun wrote his conference notes in 
his own distinct shorthand, which usually can be deciphered fairly 
accurately with experience. But, for that same reason, and because this 
Article relies heavily on Blackmun's conference notes, a caveat is 
required. Although Blackmun proffered these notes as verbatim quotes 
of what the other Justices said,15 they remain his notes of what they said, 
rather than an actual verbatim transcript by a disinterested professional 
reporter or a mechanical device. There is, accordingly, an unavoidable 
risk that Blackmun consciously or unconsciously filtered the statements 
made by other members of the Court in a manner that distorts their 
• 16 
meamng. 
Finally, a note regarding the reading of Justice Blackmun's Papers is 
in order. Many of the papers are typed, including the vast majority of law 
clerk memoranda to the Justice, correspondence between chambers, and 
draft opinions. For these documents, there is rarely any ambiguity 
concerning what the documents provide. But other papers, including 
some of the most interesting ones, are handwritten by the Justice himself. 
These include his notes in preparation for oral argument, notes taken 
during oral argument, notes taken during the Court's private conference, 
IS. Former clerks of Justice Blackmun, including Beth Brinkman, Chai Feldblum, and Charles 
Rothfeld, have each confirmed in conversations with me that the Justice presented these notes as a 
verbatim account of what each of the other Justices said at conference. 
16. Justice Blackmun would, according to former clerks, report back to his clerks what happened 
at conference by using his notes to recount what each of the other Justices said, using different voices 
for each of the Justices. Former Blackmun clerks further report that clerks from other chambers would 
sometimes come speak with them to find out what their own Justice had said at conference, to assist 
their own work. 
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and notes taken on draft opinions and law clerk memoranda. Almost all 
of these notes are taken in the Justice's own unique shorthand, which 
abbreviates many words and truncates sentences. Some translation of his 
shorthand is therefore necessary. But such translation is generally not 
difficult as one gets familiar with his patterns of abbreviation. 
For instance, in describing what Justice Brennan said at conference 
during the Court's deliberations in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
City of New York,'7 Justice Blackmun wrote "Inquire on + partic fax," 
which means simply "Inquiry into the particular facts," no doubt 
referring to the need for a court evaluating a takings claim to inquire into 
the particular facts of a case. IS Other examples are Blackmun's notations 
regarding what then-Justice Rehnquist stated at that same Penn Central 
conference. On the left is what Blackmun wrote and on the right is my 
translation: 19 
ED 5 Am & 14 Am Eminent Domain 5th 
Amendment & I4th 
Amendment 
Separate police pwr - City Separate police power - City 
can take, all right. ? Is can take, all right. Question is 
whe ty can take sans whether they can take without 
paying for it paying for it 
Holmes & Brandeis Holmes and Brandeis took 
opposite in Pa Coal opposite positions in 
Pennsylvania Coal 
In zonng, tr is a benefit ta In zoning, there is a benefit 
accompanies t burden. No that accompanies the burden. 
PP depriv in t long run. No private property 
deprivation in the long run 
Do n hv wi Landmark Do not have with Landmark 
This enuf t push me over This is enough to push me over 
TDRs n claimed t b = Transferable Development 
what is taken Rights are not claimed to be 
equal to what is taken 
This Article relies on my translation of Justice Blackmun's 
handwriting, including his shorthand, and does not just repeat verbatim 
the shorthand itself. There is, of course, as a result some risk of 
mistranslation. I have tried to minimize that possibility by not purporting 
to translate the Justice's handwriting whenever I am not confident of its 
17· 438 U.s. 104 (1978). 
18. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Penn Cent., No. 77-444 (Apr. 19, 1978) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
19. [d. 
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meaning or, at the very least, indicating in an accompanying footnote 
when there is possible ambiguity. The translations allow for an 
exceedingly rich portrayal of the Court's internal deliberations and, as a 
result, a meaningful basis for evaluating the effectiveness of individual 
Justices in deliberating with colleagues on the Court. 
The conference notes, combined with the other documents within 
the Blackmun Papers, provide a virtually unprecedented basis for both 
learning and evaluating the efforts of individual Justices to influence the 
Court's opinions beyond their own formal votes. One can perceive how 
both the opinions and the votes of the individual Justices shift over time 
as part of the Court's deliberative process, culminating in the release of 
the Court's final opinion along with any separate concurring and 
dissenting opinions. During that process, opinions are written and 
rewritten in response to requests of individual Justices, and the final 
result is even sometimes reversed between the time of the initial 
conference vote and the final opinion. The ability of a Justice to keep a 
majority in support of meaningful precedent or, conversely, to deprive 
others on the Court of their majority to establish precedent that a Justice 
opposes is generally unknown to those outside the Court. The Blackmun 
Papers, however, make such knowledge possible.20 
II. JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA, THE BLACKMUN PAPERS, 
AND THE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Justice Blackmun's tenure on the Court for just shy of twenty-five 
years offers a wealth of possibilities for evaluating individual Justices and 
substantive areas of law. This Article focuses on the property rights 
movement in the Supreme Court because the issue is of both historic and 
contemporary significance up to and including the Court's October 2004 
Term. During Justice Blackmun's tenure, the Court ruled on nineteen 
significant property rights cases involving regulatory takings claims.21 
20. This Article puts aside the legitimate issues that can be raised concerning the propriety of 
Justice Blackmun's decision in his will to disclose this information so soon after his own retirement 
and death. During an informal meeting in 2005 at which I was in attendance, a member of the Court 
suggested that none of its then-current members were likely to emulate Blackmun in this respect and 
they were instead more likely to provide for public disclosure only after the deaths of the Justices 
serving on the Court at the time the notes were taken. 
2I. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 
(1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); NoHan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); 
Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U.S. 419 (1982); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 
(1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 
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Since Justice Blackmun's resignation, the Court has decided six more 
cases," many of which build upon the earlier nineteen. This Article 
further focuses on Justice Scalia because property rights is an area of law 
in which Justice Scalia early on defined for himself a central role. Almost 
immediately upon his arrival in fall 1986, the Court began regularly to 
grant property owners petitions that raised the question whether 
government land use regulation violated federal constitutional 
protections for private property rights. For the same reason, this area of 
law and the Blackmun Papers provide a fair basis for evaluating Justice 
Scalia's effectiveness at influencing the direction of the Court's 
decisionmaking in an area of law important to him. 
A. THE PRE-SCALIA COURT 
Just a few years prior to Justice Scalia's joining the Court in 
September 1986, the Court decided several cases that raised issues 
concerning the extent to which government could, consistently with the 
Fifth Amendment, restrict private property rights. Most of these cases 
raised legal issues related to the "regulatory taking issue," based on 
Justice Holmes' opinion in 1922 for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon,23 ruling that land use regulations that go "too far" in their 
restrictions on private property violate the Fifth Amendment's 
prohibition on takings of private property in the absence of payment of 
just compensation.24 Several cases raised the question whether such an 
unconstitutional taking had in fact occurred. Others raised the related 
remedial question whether the Constitution itself required the payment 
of just compensation for such regulatory takings or whether the 
government regulator could satisfy the constitutional command simply 
by invalidating the regulation prospectively. All of these cases serve as 
the backdrop for assessing the Court's subsequent precedent, including 
the impact of Justice Scalia. 
I. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York (I978Y5 
The Penn Central case concerned a regulatory takings challenge to 
(1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn 
Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
22. San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005); Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); City of Monterey v. Del 
Monte Dunes at Monterey, LTD., 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 
U.S. 725 (1997). Two other regulatory takings cases, not discussed in this Article, arose out of claims 
brought against state laws that require lawyers to place all client funds in interest-bearing trust 
accounts and require funds not capable of earning net interest to be deposited in accounts that pool 
such funds so as to allow the payment of the resulting interest to charities. See Brown v. Legal Found. 
of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1996). 
23· 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
24 [d. at 415. 
25· 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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land use regulations imposed on historic landmarks. In 1967, New York 
City's Landmarks Preservation Commission designated Grand Central 
Station a "landmark" under the authority of New York City's Landmark 
Preservation Law. Because of that designation, all future alterations to 
the station required prior approval by the Commission. In return, the 
City granted Penn Central, the owner of the station, "transferable 
development rights" that could be used at other properties in the 
immediate area owned by Penn Central to develop those other 
properties more intensely than otherwise allowed.26 
In 1968, Penn Central submitted two separate applications to build 
fifty-five-story and fifty-three-story office buildings on top of Grand 
Central Station, for which Penn Central would make several million 
dollars a year in rene? The commission denied both applications. 28 Penn 
Central filed suit claiming that the city's application of the law had 
"taken" its property without just compensation, violating the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and arbitrarily deprived them of their 
property without due process.29 The New York Court of Appeals rejected 
the constitutional claim,30 and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in an 
opinion for the Court written by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices 
Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell, and Blackmun, and a dissent written 
by then-Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Stevens.3' 
Justice Brennan's majority opinion for the Court held that the 
historic landmark restriction on development did not amount to a taking 
of property requiring the payment of just compensation. The Court 
reasoned that the restriction on development was constitutional because 
it did not interfere with Penn Central's "primary expectation" 
concerning the use of the property,32 which was use as a railroad terminal, 
and it permitted Penn Central to "obtain a 'reasonable return' on its 
investment.,,33 The Court emphasized that the restriction did not amount 
to a flat prohibition against occupation of the air space, but was rather 
merely a prohibition of Penn Central's preferred use.34 
Ironically, in light of Penn Central's prominence in regulatory 
takings jurisprudence today, Justice Brennan apparently sought in the 
opinion to purport to be making no significant law at all. While a 
26. Id. at 129. 
27. Id. at II6-17. 
28. /d. at II7. 
29. Id. at II5-19. 
30. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977). 
31. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104. 
32. Id. at 136. 
33. Id. 
34 Id. at 136-37· 
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majority favored rejection of the takings claim, other chambers in the 
Court (in particular, Justice Stewart's) reportedly made clear at least to 
the Brennan clerk responsible for the initial draft of the opinion that the 
opinion should be essentially factbound and avoid any sweeping new 
rulings of law. That is likely why the majority opinion commences by 
candidly acknowledging that there is no "set formula" for regulatory 
takings analysis and that resolution of such cases turns on the particular 
facts of a case in light of basic principles of "justice and fairness. ,,35 What 
the Penn Central opinion does announce, in lieu of any takings formula, 
is an "ad hoc" approach focusing on three "factors" that are especially 
relevant to resolution of a takings claim.36 The three factors include the 
"economic impact" of the challenged land use restriction, the 
restriction's "interference with distinct investment-backed expectations," 
and the "character of the governmental action."37 Finally, the Court ruled 
that in evaluating a regulatory takings claim under the three-factor test, 
courts should consider the impact on the "parcel as a whole" and not just 
focus on any part of the property that might be the most burdened by the 
challenged regulation.38 
The Blackmun Papers offer new insights into the Court's decision in 
Penn Central, supporting the earlier reports that the opinion's purpose 
was not to break new ground, and answer some curiosities about the case 
that commentators (including this author) have long debated. According 
to Blackmun's notes to himself prior to the oral argument and his 
conference notes, he voted at conference to affirm the lower court's 
rejection of the takings claim, but it was "not an easy [case for him]" 
because "it has emotion."39 At conference, Justice Stewart stated that he 
was voting to affirm, emphasizing that the lower courts had "found [Penn 
Central] did not show not a reasonable return.,,40 But Justice Stewart also 
described his resolution of the case as "[v]isceral rather [than] cerebral" 
and cautioned that one "cannot make a bright line.,,41 Justice White, also 
in the majority, stated that "[r]estriction on use in and of itself [is] not a 
taking" and that an "ad hoc" approach is probably the result.42 Brennan 
himself added that the case depended on an inquiry into "the [particular 
facts]" and how here, "[Penn Central] made no effort to prove [it could 
35. [d. at 124. 
36. [d. 
37. [d. 
38. [d. at 130-3I. 
39. Harry A. Blackmun, Pre-Argument Notes, Penn Cent., No. 77'444 (Apr. 16, 1978) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
40. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Penn Cent., No. 77-444 (Apr. 19, 1978) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
41. [d. 
42. [d. 
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not] make a [reasonable] return.,,43 After first passing during conference, 
Justice Marshall voted in favor of affirming, cryptically adding that the 
case is "[a] messy mess.,,44 
The two curiosities in the voting of the individual Justices in Penn 
Central were supplied by Justice Powell and Justice Stevens. Justice 
Powell, a former corporate lawyer, was known for being sympathetic to 
business concerns, naturally skeptical of government economic 
regulation, and, for this reason, generally supportive of property rights 
claims.45 Powell, however, joined Justice Brennan's majority opinion. By 
contrast, Justice Stevens, who has been the Justice most skeptical of 
property rights claims and most sympathetic to government land use 
regulation over time,46 joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent. I have myself 
speculated that the primary motivation for Justice Powell's vote likely 
lies in his affinity for historic preservation, marked by his deep personal 
involvement with Colonial Williamsburg in his native Virginia.47 My prior 
speculation concerning Justice Stevens centered on the fact that a 
historic landmark designation, unlike most general zoning restrictions, is 
not generally applicable and therefore does not provide a "reciprocity of 
advantage" in the form of shared benefits to all similarly situated 
43. Id. 
44- Id. 
45. Just a few months before being nominated to the Court, Justice Powell authored a 
confidential memorandum to the U.S Chamber of Commerce describing what he characterized as an 
"Attack on American Free Enterprise System," in which economic regulations featured prominently. 
See Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce Edu. Comm. (Aug. 23, 1971), available at http://www.mediatransparency.org! 
story.php?StoryID=22 [hereinafter Powell Memorandum]; Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's 
Environmental about Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 729-33 (2000) 
[hereinafter Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental]; Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and 
Discounting Holdings in the Supreme Court's Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1099, II20 
(1997) [hereinafter Lazarus, Counting Votes]. 
46. In the years since the Court decided Penn Central Transportation. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104 (1978), Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinions in favor of government regulators in 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), and Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), and routinely dissented in cases in which 
property rights claims prevailed, including in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. 
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987), Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 
U.S. 374 (1994), and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
47. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental, supra note 45, at 729-33; Lazarus, Counting Votes, 
supra note 45, at II20. 
/d. 
Consider, for example, Justice Powell's sympathy for the historic preservation regulation 
challenged in Penn Central and his hostility toward restrictions on coal mining challenged in 
Keystone Bituminous. Justice Powell's contrasting votes might reflect nothing more than his 
appreciation for historic preservation and coal. Each is well established in his home state of 
Virginia, where one finds both Colonial Williamsburg and a heavy economic dependence 
on coal mining. 
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landowners.48 
Both SUspicIons proved correct. Justice Powell, during the 
conference, admitted that he had "2 Biases," which he described as being 
"Williamsburgh" and "historic preservation values.,,49 He then added 
that he would "try to affirm" the lower court,SO although he (along with 
dissenters Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stevens) had 
voted to hear the case at the jurisdictional stage.SI Justice Stevens, at 
conference, made two basic points. His first was that the "Federal 
Government in this business [i.e., historic landmarks] has always done it 
at public expense."S2 Stevens further described as "fundamental" the 
"[ d]istinction between the general and the particular. Zoning is general. 
Landmarking is not. "S3 
Finally, Brennan's opinion for the Court in Penn Central would seem 
to highlight his special ability to fashion and keep majorities while 
making law that he favored. In Penn Central, Brennan plainly lacked a 
strong majority in favor of government regulation of private property 
interests. Yet his opinion for the Court effectively held on to that 
majority by purporting to announce a mere ad hoc approach, while 
actually establishing a legal analytic framework that has proved generally 
favorable to government regulation and that remains even now, twenty-
48. Lazarus, Counting Votes, supra note 45, at II29 ("A likely distinction is that Penn Central is 
the only takings case that involved a regulation targeting particular properties and landowners rather 
than applying to all properties equally. The general applicability of the regulation was a factor that 
Justice Stevens subsequently emphasized in Lucas while defending South Carolina's law."). 
49. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Penn Cent., No. 77-444 (Apr. I9, I978) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). The latter reference to "historic preservation values" is not 
completely clear from B1ackmun's Conference Notes. Blackmun appears to have written "HP values" 
after a reference to Williamsburg. But the same abbreviation that he used for what I read as "HP" is 
also one that appears elsewhere in papers related to Penn Central (e.g., Blackmun Pre-Argument 
Notes and Conference Notes on comments on other Justices, including Rehnquist), which undercuts 
the certainty of this particular reading. It is even possible, based on those other references, that the 
reference was either to "private property" or "real property" values. Even if so, such an alternative 
reading simply underscores the conflict that Justice Powell felt between his two competing interests in 
historic preservation, represented by Colonial Williamsburg, and private property. 
50. Id. 
5!. Docket Sheet, Penn Cent., No. 77-444 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). Justice White, 
who also voted in the majority, similarly voted to note probable jurisdiction in the case. [d. 
52. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Penn Cent., No. 77-444 (Apr. 19, I978) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
53. [d. Justice Stevens' joining then-Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion for the Court in Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. I64 (I980), rather than Justice Blackmun's dissent Goined by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall), may be similarly understood. At issue in that case was whether it amounted to 
a taking of private property for the United States to insist that an owner of a private pond in Hawaii 
had, by connecting their pond to a navigable water of the United States, lost the right to exclude the 
public from their private water body. The Court ruled in favor of the property owner. Here again, the 
focused nature of the burden placed on the property owner creates an equity issue not present in 
general zoning, especially because the federal agency had initially advised the landowner of the lack of 
federal jurisdiction over their plan to connect to the bay without ever suggesting that such a physical 
connection would create a right of public access under federal law. [d. 
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eight years later, the Court's leading precedent in regulatory takings.54 
2. Andrus v. Allard (I979/5 
This case concerned a takings challenge to regulations promulgated 
by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to two federal laws, the Eagle 
Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which barred 
commercial transactions in parts of birds (e.g., feathers) killed before the 
two statutes prohibited their killing. The opinion of the Court, once 
again written by Justice Brennan, provides further support for his ability 
as a Justice to maintain his majority while crafting an opinion that 
declares substantive law that he favors. 56 In this case, the parties disputed 
both whether the federal law barred the sale of parts of birds killed 
before their killing was unlawful and, if so, whether such a restriction on 
commercial transactions amounted to an unconstitutional taking of 
property. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court 
(with Chief Justice Burger alone joining only in the jUdgment) in favor of 
the Secretary of the Interior on both issues.57 
As revealed by the Blackmun Papers, however, the unanimity of the 
final result evinces Justice Brennan's effectiveness as an influential 
member of the Court. The original vote at conference was seven to two 
in favor of upholding the regulations, with Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Stevens in dissent.58 Justice Powell also expressed substantial 
concerns with Justice Brennan's draft opinion for the Court and 
informed Brennan that if he could not accommodate those concerns, 
Powell would write separately.59 At the end of the day, however, neither 
the Chief Justice nor Justice Stevens dissented, and Justice Powell did 
not write separately, even though Brennan in fact declined to 
accommodate Powell's concerns in any significant way. 
The Chief changed his mind after concluding that the "'wildlife' 
aspect places this case in a somewhat different category from Penn 
54. See infra text accompanying notes 392--93. 
55· 444 U.S. 51 (1979)· 
56. Justice Brennan was well known for using his personal charm and his related ability to forge 
majorities on the Court. See Thurgood Marshall, Tribute, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 
104 HARV. L. REV. 1,5 (1990); Abner J. Mikva, Tribute, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 
104 HARV. L. REV. 9, 10 (1990); Richard A. Posner, Tribute, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, 
Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 13, 14 (1990); Nina Totenberg, Tribute, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, 
Jr., 104 HARV. L. REv. 33, 37-38 (1990). 
57· Andrus, 444 U.S. at 68. 
58. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Andrus v. Allard, No. 78-740 (The Blackmun Papers, 
supra note 2). At the jurisdictional stage, Justices White, Rehnquist, and Stevens voted to note 
probable jurisdiction and Justice Marshall stated that he would "join 3," which means he was willing to 
provide the necessary fourth vote if there were three other Justices favoring plenary review. The notes 
regarding the Chief Justice's vote on jurisdiction are harder to decipher. He appears to have favored 
review. See Docket Sheet, Andrus, No. 78-740 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
59. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Andrus, No. 78-740 
(Oct. 31, 1979) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
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Central" (from which he dissented).60 Justice Stevens changed his mind 
on the statutory construction issue when "[f]urther study" persuaded him 
that Brennan was "correct in stating that a flat proscription on the sale of 
wildlife, without regard to the legality of its taking, is and for a long time 
has been a traditional legislative tool for enforcing conservation policy.,,61 
Justice Powell's ultimate acquiescence, however, is the most telling. He 
objected strenuously to the statement in Brennan's draft opinion that 
'''loss of future profits ... provides a slender reed upon which to rest a 
takings claim. ",62 Powell likewise objected to the draft opinion's failure to 
make clear that the only reason that a prohibition on sale was not a 
taking in this case was based on a "nuisance theory" that allows such an 
"extraordinary intrusion on property rights... only when lesser 
measures cannot accomplish an important government purpose.,,63 Justice 
Brennan's final opinion for the Court, however, neither abandoned 
either aspect of his original opinion in any significant way, nor lost 
Justice Powell's vote.64 Brennan plainly managed to assuage Powell's 
concerns without losing the opinion's force. History, moreover, has 
proved Justice Powell's concerns well-placed given the prominence that 
government regulators have effectively given, when defending against 
takings challenges, to the parts of the Andrus v. Allard opinion about 
which Powell complained, especially the opinion's characterization of 
profits as being a "slender reed.,,6s 
3. Agins v. City of Tiburon (I98o/6 
Agins involved a classic regulatory takings challenge to a local land 
use regulation that limited the amount of permissible residential 
development. The plaintiffs owned five acres of undeveloped land in 
Tiburon, California. When the City enacted an ordinance restricting 
development in order to promote preservation of open space values, 
plaintiffs brought a lawsuit claiming that restricting their land to single-
family dwellings, with density restrictions allowing up to five such 
residences on a five acre plot, amounted to an unconstitutional taking of 
private property for which they were entitled to a payment of "just 
60. Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Harry A. B1ackmun, Andrus, No. 78-
740 (Nov. 19, 1979) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
61. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Andrus, No. 78-740 
(Oct. 31, 1979) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
62. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Andrus, No. 78-740 
(Oct. 31, 1979).(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
63. [d. 
64. Compare Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), with Andrus, No. 78-740, slip op. 12-15. 
65. See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of State of California et al. at 23, Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (No. 85-1092), 1986 WL 728344; Amici Curiae Brief of 
State of California et al. at 7 n.7, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) 
(No. 84-2015), 1985 WL 669430. 
66. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
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compensation" by the Fifth Amendment. The landowners specifically 
sought a damage remedy rather than mere invalidation of the offending 
ordinance. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review after the California 
Supreme Court ruled that no such money damage remedy was available 
under the Constitution. The Court, however, ended up affirming the 
state court judgment without reaching the remedy issue after concluding 
that the development restrictions in no event constituted a taking of 
property in the first instance.try 
Justice Powell wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court disposing of 
the case.68 Although dubbed by Justice Blackmun's clerk working on the 
case as "one of the dullest [cases] to have come down the pike this 
year,,,6<) Powell's opinion proved the potential for a Justice to make 
considerable law in writing a unanimous end of the Term decision that 
none of the other chambers may have been likely to read closely. Indeed, 
Blackmun's conference notes show that at least five of the Justices were 
open to disposing of the case without any opinion, by just dismissing the 
appeal for want of substantial federal question.70 
The Chief Justice assigned the case to Justice Powell for the drafting 
of the Court's opinion, and he produced an opinion that, until very 
recently,71 played a significant role in the Court's takings law. The Agins 
opinion announced a new regulatory takings test, under which a land use 
regulation is a taking if it "does not substantially advance legitimate state 
interests" or it "denies an owner economically viable use of his land."72 
Although the Court easily concluded that the City of Tiburon's 
ordinance satisfied both tests, the upshot was nonetheless a new 
direction in takings law. 
The crafting of the Court's opinion strongly suggests that Justice 
Powell was carefully, and subtly, moving the Court toward a more 
aggressive view of the Takings Clause, perhaps partly in response to his 
failure to get Justice Brennan to modify his opinion for the Court earlier 
that same Term in Andrus.73 Powell's creation of the "economically 
viable use" test, for instance, was far from obvious. It required his 
resurrection of what had previously been seen as an incidental statement 
about economic viability in a final footnote of the Penn Central majority 
67. Id. 
68. At the jurisdictional stage, the Chief Justice, and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist voted 
in favor of Supreme Court review, and Justice Marshall indicated his willingness to supply the fourth 
vote for review if there were three other Justices supporting review. See Docket Sheet, Agins, No. 79-
602 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
69. Clerk Bench Memo at 18, Agins, No. 79-602 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
70. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Agins, No. 79-602 (Apr. 18, 1980) (The Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 2). 
71. See infra text accompanying notes 375-76. 
72. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 u.s. 255, 260 (1980). 
73. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64; Powell Memorandum, supra note 45. 
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opinion.74 Close examination of the oral argument in Penn Central, 
however, provides strong support for the notion that Powell may well 
have been responsible for Justice Brennan's inclusion of the language 
that Powell later effectively exploited in Agins.75 The conference notes 
for Penn Central provide some additional support for that thesis. 
According to those notes, Powell raised at conference the very question 
that the final Penn Central footnote sought to answer about whether 
Penn Central might have a valid takings claim in the future under 
different and less favorable economic conditions.76 But, whatever its 
origins, the "economically viable" test that Justice Powell wrote into the 
Court's opinion in Agins subsequently proved fertile breeding ground for 
what is widely considered the high water mark for the property rights 
movement in Justice Scalia's announcement of a per se takings test 
twelve years later in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.77 
The other prong of the Agins test-whether the regulation 
"substantially advance [ s] legitimate state interests"78 -likewise strongly 
expanded constitutional protection of property rights, even while the 
Agins Court was seemingly just quickly dismissing a takings claim that 
lacked all merit. As now revealed by the Blackmun Papers, then-Justice 
Rehnquist is the one member of the Court who took explicit notice of 
the potential shift implicated by the test and specifically questioned 
Powell about it in formal written correspondence between their 
chambers. Rehnquist expressed some disquiet - "somewhat uneasy"-
about the lack of latitude that the substantially advance test appeared to 
give local government and proposed to Powell substitute language that 
would "allow[] the states somewhat more latitude. ,,79 Rehnquist indicated 
that if Powell declined, he would "simply write a short separate 
concurrence."So Powell did in fact decline,8' but Rehnquist nevertheless 
joined Powell's majority opinion for the Court without any separate 
writing. 
With the benefit of hindsight, Justice Rehnquist's concerns were 
74. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citing Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104. 
138 n·36 (1978)). 
75. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41-44, Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104 (No. 77-444); see Lazarus, 
Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the U.s. Supreme Court, supra note 45. 
at 733 & n.17!. 
76. Harry A. Blackmun. Conference Notes, Penn Cent., No. 77-444 (Apr. 19, 1978) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2) ("If ICC [Interstate Commerce Commission) ordered closure [of 
Grand Central), the court could reopen [the takings claim.)"). 
77. 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); see infra text accompanying notes 256-57. 
78. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980). 
79. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Agins, No. 79-602 
(May 29,1980) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
80. Id. 
8!. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William H. Rehnquist, Agins, No. 79-602 
(May 29,1980) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
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remarkably prescient. As discussed below,s2 six years later, Justice Scalia 
relied on the "substantially advance" language of Agins in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commissions3 to construct a more exacting 
constitutional standard applicable to land use regulatory exactions that 
lift otherwise applicable restrictions on development. And, even more 
remarkably, also as discussed below,&! the entire Court twenty-five years 
later in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. unanimously overruled the Agins 
"substantially advance" test on the ground that "it has no proper place in 
our takings jurisprudence."ss Coming full circle, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
agreed. In Lingle, he joined the Court's opinion repudiating the very 
language in the Agins opinion that he had originally found troubling.86 
4. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego (I98I/7 
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego was the last of the 
significant regulatory takings cases decided by the Court prior to Justice 
Scalia's joining the Court. The case raised the remedy issue that had 
motivated the Court's grant of review in Agins v. City of Tiburon, but 
which the Court nonetheless did not reach upon concluding that there 
was no taking of property and therefore no occasion to discuss remedy. 
Because the Justices granted review in San Diego Gas & Electric almost 
82. See infra text accompanying note 231. 
83. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
84. See infra text accompanying notes 375-76. 
85. 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2005). 
86. Rehnquist's foresight was similarly evident in comments he made to Justice Blackmun 
concerning Blackmun's draft majority opinion in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984). The 
case concerned a regulatory takings challenge to a federal statute that provided for public disclosure of 
trade secret information included in a pesticide company's application for a federally mandated 
pesticide registration. Rehnquist expressed concern with the draft opinion's notion that a taking could 
not occur so long as the pesticide company had notice of the possible disclosure prior to submitting the 
registration application. In correspondence to Blackmun, Rehnquist asked whether this portion of the 
opinion either decided or intimated "that it would be consistent with the 'takings' clause for a board of 
supervisors to provide that all submissions of subdivision of more than 40 acres made after a particular 
date would have to include a deed of at least 25 % of the gross acreage owned to the county as a 
park?" See Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto, No. 83-196 (June 12, 1984) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). Although Blackmun 
apparently declined any change and Rehnquist here too did not dissent or otherwise write separately, 
Rehnquist's concern was well placed. In fact, government attorneys relied on that portion of the 
majority opinion in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto to make the very argument Rehnquist found potentially 
troubling. In particular, in two subsequent regulatory takings cases-Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission in 1992 and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island in 2001 -relying on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, they 
contended that so long as a landowner had notice of a development restriction prior to purchasing the 
property, they could not later complain of an unconstitutional taking, even if that restriction required 
dedication to the government of a portion of their property. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Rhode 
Island at 46, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047), 2001 WL 22908; Brief for 
Council of State Governments et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee at 23, Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (No. 86-133), 1987 WL 864767. However, notwithstanding 
Rehnquist's correctness in identifying the possibility of such an application of Ruckelshaus, the Court 
had little trouble subsequently rejecting the arguments in both Nollan and Palazzolo. 
87. 450 U.S. 621 (1981). 
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immediately after deciding Agins, it has long been assumed88 that the 
Justices linked the two cases and granted the second to reach the Agins 
remedy issue. The Blackmun Papers now confirm the correctness of that 
assumption. In a "Memorandum to the Conference" dated one day after 
the Court issued its opinion in Agins, Justice Powell wrote the other 
members of the Court about the San Diego opinion, describing it as 
"present[ing] the remedies issue that was not reached in Agins," and 
recommending plenary review.89 In his handwritten notes on the case, 
Justice Blackmun succinctly declared: "A gins v. Tiburon revisited."90 
In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Court ultimately 
frustrated the landowners (and several members of the Court) by failing 
again to reach the remedy issue. This time, however, the obstacle was the 
absence of a final state court judgment. Chief Justice Burger, Justices 
White, Stevens, and Rehnquist, all joined Justice Blackmun's majority 
opinion for the Court. The gravamen of the majority opinion was that 
the state court's failure to decide whether a taking had occurred 
prevented the Court from having jurisdiction to review the state court's 
inherently non-final discussion of what remedy would exist were there a 
taking.91 
The most significant part of the case, however, was the dissenting 
opinion authored by Justice Brennan, because of its portent for the 
remedy issue once it did reach the Court in a future case. The dissent 
concluded that the Fifth Amendment, by its own terms, compelled a 
money damages remedy for "just compensation" for regulatory takings 
of private property.92 According to the dissent, although government 
could avoid a forced purchase of the property by rescinding the 
offending regulation prospectively, the government still had to pay the 
property owner "just compensation" for the temporary taking that had 
necessarily occurred prior to that rescission.93 
The fact, moreover, that Justice Brennan authored the dissent 
Goined by three other Justices) left little doubt that a majority of the 
Justices would be willing to embrace the dissent's view of the remedy 
issue once a case properly presented that issue to the Court. As one of 
the more liberal members of the Court and a Justice whom 
88. See, e.g., Anti Trust Cost Case is Accepted. N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1980, at DI ("The Justices, 
apparently eager to settle questions unresolved in last week's opinion on the rights of property owners 
whose land is rezoned for conservation, agreed to hear an appeal by a California utility from a decision 
denying it the right to sue for damages for the rezoning of its property."). 
89. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Memorandum to the Conference, Agins, No. 79-602 (June II, 1980) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
90. Harry A. Blackmun, Pre-Argument Notes, San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 79-678 (Nov. 3°,1980) 
(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
91. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 631-32. 
92. [d. at 646-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
93. [d. at 653-<; I. 
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environmentalists and government regulators had presumed to be 
sympathetic to land use regulation, Brennan's position made 
immediately apparent that the Court was prepared to rule in favor of 
property owners on the remedy issue. While Justice Marshall's decision 
to join Justice Brennan's dissent made that likelihood a virtual certainty, 
Justice Rehnquist filed a separate concurring opinion to remove any 
possible doubt. While agreeing with (and joining) the Court's holding 
concerning the absence of a final state court judgment, Justice 
Rehnquist's concurrence added that, in the absence of that jurisdictional 
bar, he "would have little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said 
in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan.,,94 In fact, as discussed 
below/5 six years later, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist authored an opinion 
for the Court in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of 
Los Angeles96 that effectively converted the Brennan dissent into a 
majority ruling. 
The Blackmun Papers add a further gloss to the case and the 
internal decisionmaking dynamics within the Court. Although the Chief 
Justice assigned Justice Blackmun the responsibility for drafting the 
opinion of the Court based on the conference vote of a five Justice 
majority,97 Justice Blackmun lost one of his votes and potentially the 
Court opinion when Justice Marshall subsequently switched sides in 
favor of Justice Brennan's dissent.g8 The switch meant that the Brennan 
dissent could become the opinion of the Court, relegating Blackmun to 
the dissent. Indeed, Justice Blackmun was apparently so unhappy about 
the possible loss of a Court majority that he wrote a letter to Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, seeming to blame him for this development. In 
particular, he chided the Chief Justice for not heeding Justice 
Blackmun's advice given "now four weeks ago, that you vote fairly 
promptly so that, it was to be hoped, your vote would have some 
influence upon Thurgood.... Thurgood has now slipped away, as 
perhaps was not to be unanticipated whenever Bill Brennan is on the 
other side and writing the dissent.,,99 
Justice Blackmun succeeded in keeping the majority only because 
Rehnquist decided to switch sides after originally voting with Brennan on 
the jurisdictional issue. 100 Rehnquist did so only after obtaining 
94- [d. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
95. See infra text accompanying notes 194-97. 
96. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
97. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 79-678 (Dec. 3, 1980) 
(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
98. [d.; Docket Sheet, San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 79-678 (Dec. 3, 1980) (The Blackmun Papers, 
supra note 2). 
99. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, San Diego Gas & 
Elec., No. 79-678 (Mar. II, 1981) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
100. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 79-678 (Dec. 3, 1980) 
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assurances from Blackmun that Blackmun's opinion would not rely on or 
otherwise cite to Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 101 an earlier Supreme 
Court case from which Rehnquist dissented. The Blackmun Papers 
include a handwritten note from Rehnquist to Blackmun asking him 
about the impact of his draft opinion on Cox, but also adding: "If this is 
an unfair question, you will not offend me by throwing this in the waste 
basket. ,,102 Blackmun replied the next day with a memo explaining why 
Cox was not implicated. IOJ 
Finally, the Blackmun Papers further reveal that although Justice 
Brennan voted at conference to reverse on the remedy issue, he 
expressed a fair amount of ambivalence at the time. He apparently began 
his remarks at conference by stating that he was "confused.,,104 After 
explaining, moreover, his reasons for believing that invalidation of the 
regulation deemed a taking was not, by itself, a sufficient constitutional 
remedy, he added that he was "not fully at rest."IOS 
5. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (I982)"X, 
In Loretto, the Court faced a different kind of takings claim against 
local government, which produced a different lineup of the Justices and 
introduced a new per se test for certain kinds of government actions. In 
Penn Central,IO'] the Court had described the "character of the 
governmental action" as one of the three factors especially relevant to 
takings analysis,l08 and elaborated by adding that "[ a] 'taking' may more 
readily be found when the interference with property can be 
characterized as a physical invasion by government."IO<) In Loretto, the 
Court announced that a permanent physical occupation of another's real 
property authorized by government amounted to a per se taking, without 
the need for any formal balancing under Penn Central."o The Court 
reasoned that "when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a 
permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred. In such a case, 
'the character of the government action' not only is an important factor 
in resolving whether the action works a taking but also is 
(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
IOI. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
I02. Handwritten Note from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, San 
Diego Gas & Elec., No. 79-678 (Jan. 21,1981) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
I03. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William H. Rehnquist, San Diego Gas & 
Elec., No. 79-678 (Jan. 22, 1981) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
I04. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 79-678 (Dec. 3, 1980) 
(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
I05. Id. 
106. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
107. 438 U.S. I04 (1978). 
I08. Id. at 124. 
109. Id. 
lIO. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426. 
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determinative.,,111 
At issue in Loretto was a New York City law that required landlords 
to allow cable television operators to place cables in buildings owned by 
the landlord as necessary to provide cable television service to tenants in 
the building and to "crossover" to reach tenants in nearby buildings. The 
municipal law required that the cable company pay a "reasonable fee" to 
the landlords. The city had concluded that fee should amount to one 
dollar. Prior to New York's enactment of this law, cable operators had to 
negotiate with individual landowners for access and for terms of 
payment, which typically amounted to five percent of the gross cable 
television revenues from that property.1I2 
The voting lineup on the Court was significant because Justices 
Marshall and Brennan were on opposite sides. It was also the first 
takings case after Justice O'Connor joined the Court. Justice Marshall 
wrote the majority opinion for the Court in favor of the property owners, 
which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Powell, Stevens, and 
O'Connor joined. Justice Blackmun dissented and was joined by Justices 
White and Brennan. The former Solicitor General and Harvard Law 
School Dean, Erwin Griswold, represented the respondents cable 
television companies and City of New York at oral argument in the 
case. 1I3 
Blackmun's conference notes show that the Chief Justice originally 
passed prior to voting in favor of the landlords.1I4 He acknowledged that 
he had "trouble with this case,,115 because of the possible analogy to 
municipal requirements for the location of sprinklers and smoke alarms, 
but he ultimately concluded that the "educational value" of cable 
television "does not bring this to a level with sprinklers." 116 The 
conference notes also show that even those Justices (like Brennan and 
White) who ended up dissenting in favor of the City and cable television 
operators distinguished between cables used for providing service to 
tenants in the landowner's own building and "crossover" cables 
providing service in other buildings. Justice Brennan favored the 
landlords' position on the "crossover" issue, and Justice White at 
conference was unsure of his vote on that issue, tentatively voting in 
favor of the respondents. Justice Powell at conference voted like 
Brennan, although he ended up subsequently joining the majority in its 
III. [d. 
II 2. [d. at 423. 
II3. [d. aq2o. 
II4. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Loretto, No. 81-244 (Apr. 2, 1982) (The Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 2). 
115. [d. ("I hv trouble wi this case."). 
116. [d. ("St hs t pwr t compell sprinkler smoke warnings etc. But this? * * * Educ value ds n brng 
this to a level wi sprinklers"). 
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en tirety. 117 
Justice Marshall saw the issue very simply. He exclaimed at 
conference, "[I] cannot buy this"; he saw no difference between the 
crossover and non-crossover issue for the simple reason that in either 
case it was "my roof."IIS Justice Stevens likewise stated that he felt "very 
strongly" that the landowners should win. As in Penn Central, Stevens 
here too indicated that the absence of general reciprocity was key. The 
conference notes suggest he said that it would be "OK" if every building 
had to do this, "[b]ut here a special company and the City takes the five 
percent whenever they want." Stevens also noted that Griswold "did a 
fine snow job" in arguing the case for respondents.'I9 Finally, Blackmun's 
conference notes on O'Connor are striking because, as in future 
occasions,Ilo Blackmun emphasizes what he perceives as the emotional 
character of her views. He describes O'Connor as voting in favor of 
respondents and saying the case is "shocking!" and "unbelievable!"IlI 
What, in retrospect, Loretto contributed to the Court's taking 
jurisprudence was a potential analytic line of departure from the Penn 
Central balancing framework embraced by Justice Brennan in his 
opinion for the Court in that case. The Court opinion in Loretto 
endorsed the potential for extracting from Penn Central a series of per se 
takings tests, defining circumstances when Penn Central balancing would 
not be required. Justice Scalia subsequently seized upon this precedent 
to try to do just that a decade later. Ill 
6. Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank (I985r3 
Three years later, the Court returned for yet a third time to the 
regulatory takings damage remedy issue, but once again without 
success. Il4 In Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, the Sixth Circuit had, 
relying on the four Justices joining Justice Brennan's San Diego dissent 
II 7. [d. 
II8. [d. ("Cann buy this··· no difbtw t 2-my roof'). 
II 9. [d. ("Very strongly • • • PP OK wn every dldg is t do this & so. But here a special co & t city 
takes t 5 % wnever ty want • • • Griswold did a fine sno job"). 
120. See infra note 209. Blackmun's characterization of the views of Justice O'Connor on this 
occasion and on others arguably reflect an apparent antipathy toward O'Connor or at least suspicion 
of her that Blackmun harbored almost as soon as she joined the Court. A recent biography of 
O'Connor documents that hostility and suggests that it may have resulted from possible jealousy about 
the tremendous amount of attention being received by O'Connor upon joining the Court, or 
alternatively, might have derived from concern that the new Justice might vote to overrule Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. II3 (1973). See JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR-How THE FIRST WOMAN ON 
THE SUPREME COURT BECAME ITs MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 114, 140, 160-61 (2005). 
12I. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Loretto, No. 81-244 (Apr. 2, 1982) (The Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 2). 
122. See infra text accompanying notes 256-57. 
123. 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
124. The Court also tried to reach the remedy issue but again failed because of the absence of 
ripeness in MacDonald, Somer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986). 
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and Justice Rehnquist's concurring statement in that same case, ruled 
that the Constitution compelled a damage remedy for a temporary 
regulatory taking. The Supreme Court again granted review but reversed 
for lack of ripeness, thereby frustrating property rights advocates one 
more time. '25 
Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court, which Chief 
Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist, and 
O'Connor joined. The majority held that the regulatory takings claim 
was not ripe on two separate grounds. The first deficiency was that there 
had been no "final decision" because the landowner had failed to submit 
a final development application with the relevant governmental body, 
including one for available variances.126 Absent such a final governmental 
ruling, it was not possible to assess an as-applied takings claim. The 
second, independent ground for lack of ripeness was that the landowner 
had never pursued available state administrative or judicial avenues for 
obtaining "just compensation" for any taking resulting from the 
application of a state regulation. Consequently, no viable claim could be 
made in federal court that there had been a taking without "just 
compensation" in violation of the Fifth Amendment. An owner of 
property claiming, therefore, that a state regulation violates the Fifth 
Amendment must first establish that the state denied her "just 
compensation.,,127 Justice White dissented on the ground that the takings 
claim was ripe for review. 128 Justices Brennan and Marshall joined the 
majority, but also wrote separately to make clear that they were adhering 
to the views expressed on the remedy issue in the San Diego dissent. 129 
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on the ground that it was clear 
that the landowner was not entitled to any damage remedy because there 
had been no temporary taking. '30 Justice Powell took no part in the 
consideration or decision in the case.131 
The Blackmun Papers show that at conference the vote was similar 
to the final outcome except that Justice Rehnquist gave a "tentative" 
vote in favor of the landowner and affirmance, but also acknowledged 
that he was "[i]n equipoise.,,'32 He also wrote Chief Justice Burger a few 
days after conference to explain that he thought that his "vote to affirm 
in this case may be misleading."'33 Somewhat surprisingly in light of his 
125. 473 U.s. at 190-94. 
126. /d. at 190-91. 
127. Id. at 194-97. 
128. /d. at 200. 
129. Id. at 20I. 
130. Id. at 202-06. 
131. Id. at 174. 
132. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Williamson County, No. 84-4 (Feb. 22, 1985) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
133. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Williamson 
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other precedent, Rehnquist stated that he "d[id]n't think a 'taking' clause 
analysis [was] proper when there has been no physical invasion and no 
effort to acquire by condemnation."I34 And, in a subsequent letter to 
Justice Blackmun, asking for a change in the draft majority opinion, '35 
Rehnquist further acknowledged that "[t]his was a tough case to be 
assigned the opinion to write, because as I recall we were split up all over 
the lot at Conference."I36 
B. SCALIA ON THE COURT 
Soon after Justice Scalia joined the Supreme Court in 1986, he 
quickly became the property rights movement's strongest ally on the 
bench. During his very first Term, he voted in favor of greater protection 
of property owners in all four of the significant property rights cases 
before the Court that Term.'37 In the last of the four, Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission,'38 in which Scalia himself authored the opinion for 
the Court, the Court held that a land use regulation amounted to an 
unconstitutional taking-the first time the Court had done so since 
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon in 1922.'39 The opinion's rhetoric, moreover, 
was entirely sympathetic to the claims of the property rights movement, 
County, No. 84-4 (Feb. 25, 1985) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
134- Id. 
135. Rehnquist asked Blackmun to include in his opinion an analogy to Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 
527 (1981), to which Blackmun agreed. See Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Harry 
A. Blackmun, Re: Williamson Planning Commission [sic]. No. 84-4 (June ro, 1985) (The Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 2); Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William H. Rehnquist, Re: 
Williamson County, No. 84-4 (June II, 1985) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). Apparently, at 
Justice Brennan's insistence, Blackmun also included a footnote limiting the significance of the 
citation to Parratt, to which Rehnquist then objected. Blackmun ultimately redrafted the opinion in a 
manner that satisfied both Rehnquist and Brennan, while decrying to the former the challenges 
presented to the opinion writer "encounter[ing] the usual cross-fire between" conflicting positions of 
individual Justices all in the majority. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun, Re: Williamson County, No. 84-4 (June 12, 1985) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); 
Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William H. Rehnquist, Re: Williamson Planning 
Commission, No. 84-4 (June 13, 1985) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); Letter from Justice 
William H. Rehnquist to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Re: Williamson County, No. 84-4 (June 13, 1985) 
(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
136. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Williamson 
Planning Comm'n, No. 84-4 (June ro, 1985) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
137. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 
481 U.S. 704 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304 (1987); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). I am treating as less 
significant here a fifth takings case before the Court that same Term, United States v. Cherokee Nation 
of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700 (1987). The Court in that case unanimously ruled that the federal 
government could exercise its navigation servitude power to regulate navigational uses of waters and 
that any resulting harm to riparian interests or owners of the navigable riverbed does not amount to a 
taking of private property because all owners of such property hold their property subject to that 
dominant governmental power. 
138. 483 U.S. 825. 
139. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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expressing marked disdain for the efficacy, if not good faith motivation, 
of environmental land use regulators. When, six years later, Justice Scalia 
followed up on Nollan with his seemingly sweeping opinion for the Court 
favorable to the landowner in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,140 
the property rights movement had every reason to believe that it had 
found a champion on the High Court. 
The Blackmun Papers, however, suggest a different story and 
outcome. They show not only that Justice Scalia did not immediately 
embrace the agenda of the property rights movement in all respects, but 
that once he did, he stumbled. Ironically, the reason for his stumble may 
have been his willingness to embrace the movement's sharp rhetoric 
rather than his ability to craft the kinds of opinions more likely to further 
the movement's interests over the longer term. 
I. Hodel v. Irving (I987)'41 
The first case argued on Justice Scalia's first day on the bench (and 
also Rehnquist's first as Chief Justice), Hodel v. Irving, raised a 
regulatory takings issue, albeit in an unusual context. In response to the 
increasing fragmentation of ownership of Indian Lands, Congress 
enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, providing that no 
undivided fractional interest in Indian lands shall descend by intestacy or 
devise, but, instead, shall escheat to the tribe "if such interest represents 
2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to 
its owner less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to 
escheat.,,142 
The federal statute did not provide for any payment of 
compensation to the owners of the interests escheated to the tribe 
pursuant to this provision. The Court unanimously struck down the 
federal statute as unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor authored the 
majority opinion for seven members of the Court, which applied the 
Penn Central three-factor analysis in ruling that the federal escheat 
provision amounted to an unconstitutional taking.143 Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, and Blackmun joined the majority opinion, but also joined 
Brennan's short separate concurring opinion stating the view that the 
Court ruling did not disturb the Court's decision in Andrus v. Allard. 144 
The Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Powell likewise joined the 
majority opinion, but also filed a competing concurring opinion, 
authored by Justice Scalia, which contended that Andrus v. Allard was 
140. 50S U.s. 1003 (1992). 
141. 481 U.s. 704 (1987). 
142. Pub. L. 97-459, tit. II, 96 Stat. 2519 (1983). 
143. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 713-18. 
1# [d. at 718. 
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now limited to the facts of that case. 14S Finally, Justice Stevens filed a 
separate concurring opinion, joined by Justice White, finding the federal 
law unconstitutional, but for lack of notice as required by due process 
rather than on takings grounds. 146 
The Blackmun Papers reveal the reason why it took the Court more 
than seven months (until May 18, 1987) to decide a case argued the first 
Monday of October. Certainly, there was little about this case that would 
have prompted outside observers to anticipate that its resolution would 
have produced such a struggle within the Court. The nature of that 
struggle, however, especially the role that Justice Scalia played in its 
promotion and persistence, is emblematic of his tenure on the Court ever 
since. 
As described by Blackmun's Oral Argument Notes, during the 
argument itself, Justice Scalia was "hung up on" the question whether 
the plaintiffs even had standing to bring this claim.147 What was most 
remarkable about Scalia's questioning, however, was how hard he 
pressed the federal government for not taking a sufficiently aggressive 
position in arguing that plaintiffs lacked standing. 148 Although the Court's 
final opinion ultimately appeared to have little trouble concluding that 
standing was in fact easily met, much of the oral argument was 
dominated by Scalia's aggressive questioning of the attorney from the 
Solicitor General's Office. Indeed, legal commentary of the day focused 
on Scalia's questioning at oral argument in Hodel v. Irving, remarking 
upon his effectiveness in calling the executive branch to task.149 
Blackmun's conference notes further reveal that the initial vote 
concerning the federal law's possible unconstitutionality was not as 
lopsided as that when the Court announced its opinion seven months 
later. lso The Chief Justice and Justice Brennan both stated that there was 
no taking and that the due process notice issue was not before the 
Court. 151 Justice Powell agreed that there was no constitutional 
infirmity.ls2 Justice Stevens agreed that there was no taking, but indicated 
that he would reach the due process issue and find the law 
unconstitutional on that distinct ground based on lack of notice as 
145. [d. at 719. 
146. [d. at 719-34. 
147. Harry A Blackmun, Oral Argument Notes, Hodel, No. 85-637 (Oct. 6, 1986) (The Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 2). 
148. See Official Report of Oral Argument, Hodel v. Irving, No. 85-637 (Oct. 6, 1986). 
149. Stephen J Adler, Scalia's Court: How the Newest Justice Has Effected a Quiet Revolution in 
the Rehnquist Court, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Mar. 1987. 
ISO. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Hodel, No. 85-637 (Oct. 8, 1986) (The Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 2). 
151. [d. 
152. [d. 
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applied to those who died early.153 
There was, moreover, significant tentativeness in the votes of the 
five members of the Court who stated that the federal statute amounted 
to an unconstitutional taking. Justice White stated that although he was 
voting with the majority, he was "not now so sure" and he had thought 
"that easy for US at first.,,'54 Justice Marshall said he shared White's 
views. '55 Justice O'Connor described her view of the merits as 
"tentative," and Justice Scalia did not think the federal statute was 
unconstitutional in all applications. '56 He contended the escheat provision 
did not constitute a taking or due process deprivation as applied to those 
who died intestate, but did when applied to those who sought to pass on 
their property by devise. '5? Because Justice Blackmun's conference notes 
never elaborate upon the reasons he may have expressed for his vote, all 
we know is that he voted to affirm the lower court's judgment that the 
federal law was an unconstitutional taking. 
After Justice White (as the senior Justice in the majority) assigned 
the opinion for the Court to Justice Stevens, the Court quickly broke 
down. Justice Stevens, consistent with his discussion at conference, 
circulated within a few weeks to the other chambers a draft opinion that 
rested exclusively on the absence of due process and otherwise sought to 
limit the ruling to the Indian trust relationship. Justice O'Connor 
immediately responded with a letter to Justice Stevens, declining to join 
the opinion, restating her preference to affirm the lower court judgment 
in part on the basis of the Takings Clause, and declaring her intent to 
"await further writing.,,'58 The next day Justice Scalia wrote a letter to 
Stevens saying that he "share[d] Sandra's concerns," thought that the 
"elimination of the right to pass property by will violates the takings 
clause, although its change in what happens to property absent a will 
does not.,,159 Scalia added that he intended "to try [his] hand at an 
opinion along these lines in the hope of persuading you and the rest of 
my colleagues.",60 One day later, Justice Powell stated in a letter to 
Stevens that he was "not at rest" and would await "further writing." 161 
Justice Blackmun five days letter informed Stevens by letter that he was 
153. [d. 
154 [d. 
155. [d. 
156. [d. 
157. [d. 
158. Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice John Paul Stevens, Hodel, No. 85-687 
(Nov. 3, 1986) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
159. Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice John Paul Stevens, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Nov. 4, 
1986) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
160. [d. 
16r. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice John Paul Stevens, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Nov. 
5, 1986) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
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"in somewhat the same position as that taken by Sandra and Nino" and 
would "await further writing or shall pen a few words myself.,,162 
It was not, however, until late February that Justice Scalia finally 
circulated his draft opinion in the case and let it be known, at least 
through his law clerks, that he hoped to secure a majority for his views 
and therefore convert his concurrence into an opinion of the Court. 163 
Unlike his statements at conference and in his earlier correspondence 
with Stevens, Scalia's draft concluded that the federal statute was a 
taking whether or not the property was transmitted by descent or by 
devise.'64 In addition, as described by one of Blackmun's law clerks, the 
draft opinion took "a restrictive view of standing" and made "broad 
statements" that "seem to be a reflection of Justice Scalia's personal 
philosophy and not at all necessary to a decision in the case. ,, 165 
Although Justice Blackmun had voted at conference that the federal 
law was a taking,'66 which was the same result advocated by Scalia's draft, 
Blackmun declined to join the opinion. According to Blackmun's law 
clerk, the "fundamental problem" with the Scalia opinion was that it 
"eschews the traditional takings balancing analysis entirely" in favor of 
"a hard and fast rule with implications far beyond 'Indian' cases.,,167 
Perhaps for this same reason, however, Justice Powell and the Chief 
Justice, both of whom had voted on the other side at conference, were 
the first to join Scalia's opinion, each stating in separate letters that they 
found the opinion "persuasive.,,168 In short, it appears that once Justice 
Scalia decided in February to use the Hodel v. Irving case to further a 
broader property rights agenda, two members of the Court more 
sympathetic to that agenda were quickly willing to change their earlier 
views about this particular case and sign on. 
According to the memorandum prepared by Justice Blackmun's law 
clerk summarizing the reactions within the other chambers to the Scalia 
opinion, however, the rest of the Court did not follow suit.'6<} Brennan 
still believed that there was no taking and the case should be remanded 
162. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice John Paul Stevens, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Nov. 
ro, 1986) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
163. Clerk Memorandum to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Feb. 20, 1986) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
164- Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Oct. 8, 1986) (The Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 2). 
167. Clerk Memorandum to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Mar. 9, 1986) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
168. Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Antonin Scalia, Hodel, No. 85-687 
(Mar. 3, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice 
Antonin Scalia, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Feb. 26, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
169. Clerk Memorandum to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Mar. 9, 19B7) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
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for consideration of the due process issue raised by Stevens. '70 White had 
assigned the case to Stevens, but still had not even himself signed on to 
the Stevens draft opinion for the Court. '7' Marshall's clerks reported that 
Marshall "wants the Indians to win and doesn't think he will join Justice 
Scalia's opinion."'72 The Blackmun clerk also wrote to the Justice that 
"Justice O'Connor's clerk is very uncomfortable with Justice Scalia's 
opinion, but [O'Connor's clerk] doesn't think that she wants to write.,,'73 
The logjam was finally broken in mid-March when Justice O'Connor 
circulated her own draft concurring opinion that found a taking relying 
on a Penn Central balancing analysis.'74 By the end of April, O'Connor 
was circulating the draft as an opinion for the Court, which she described 
in correspondence with the other chambers as "the result of efforts to 
seek a compromise between Nino's approach and the approach in my 
dissent." '75 After O'Connor acquiesced in Scalia's request that she 
eliminate from her draft language distinguishing Andrus v. Allard'76 and 
Brennan decided, notwithstanding that revision, '77 to join the majority 
opinion, the disassembling of Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court was 
complete. Justice Stevens was left to file his opinion relying on due 
process as a separate concurring opinion, which only Justice White 
jOined,'78 perhaps just out of courtesy given that White had plainly erred 
in originally assigning Stevens the opinion for the Court. 
In all events, Justice Scalia stalled in his first effort, literally out of 
the box, to begin to move the Court to promote property rights more 
aggressively. Notwithstanding the plaudits he received from 
commentators for his opening day performance at oral argument, he had 
little to show for it the day the Court actually announced its opinion. The 
170. ld. at 3. 
171. ld. 
172. /d. 
173- ld. 
174. Clerk Memorandum to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Mar. 12, 1987) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2) ("This is it! I was hoping that if we waited long enough there would 
be an opinion that I could recommend that you join-Justice O'Connor has found a taking by applying 
the traditional balancing test."). 
175. Sandra Day O'Connor, Memorandum to the Conference, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Apr. 21, 1987) 
(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
176. Sandra Day O'Connor, Memorandum to the Conference, Hodel, No. 85-687 (May 5, 1987) 
(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
177. Letter from Justice William H. Brennan to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Hodel, No. 85-687 
(May 8, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2) ("I regret having to prolong the agony in the 
above, but I am uncomfortable with the case as it now stands. Your decision to delete any discussion 
of Allard, standing by itself, was not troublesome for me. Viewed in tandem with Nino's concurrence, 
however, the practical result is to limit Allard to its facts."). Justice Brennan ultimately joined 
Blackmun's majority opinion and wrote his own short concurring opinion taking issue with Scalia's 
reading of the impact of Hodel on Allard. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,718 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
178. 481 U.S. at 719. 
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standing issue he trumpeted with great fanfare at oral argument proved 
to have no legs, as no one, including even Scalia, subsequently embraced 
the concerns he had expressed in October in any of the actual written 
opinions. 179 And, Scalia failed in his efforts to use Hodel v. Irving as an 
effective vehicle to declare a bright line takings test more favorable to 
property owners than he considered the Penn Central multi-factor 
balancing framework. When the dust settled, Justice O'Connor, not 
Justice Scalia, proved the more effective in crafting an opinion for the 
Court. ISo 
2. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis (I987/81 
The Court heard oral argument in Keystone Bituminous in 
November, little more than a month after oral argument in Hodel v. 
Irving, and just after it was becoming clear that Justice Stevens lacked a 
majority for his draft opinion relying on due process in that case. The 
case was strikingly reminiscent of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon/ 82 the 
fountainhead of the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence. Both 
Keystone Bituminous and Pennsylvania Coal involved regulatory takings 
challenges to restrictions on coal mining in Pennsylvania that were 
designed to limit the adverse public safety consequences of such mining 
due to surface subsidence. Both restrictions had the necessary 
consequence of limiting the mineral estate's ability to mine coal and 
benefiting the competing owner of the surface estate whose rights were 
otherwise by private contact subservient to the mineral estate. In 
Pennsylvania Coal, a closely divided Court struck down the mining 
restriction as an unconstitutional taking. But, in Keystone Bituminous, a 
closely divided Court upheld the state law in the context of a facial 
takings challenge. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, joined by 
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun. 183 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist dissented, joined by Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia.184 
Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court relied on an extremely narrow 
reading of the Pennsylvania Coal precedent, treating as mere dicta much 
of Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court in that case. 
Unlike Hodel v. Irving, the final opinions in Keystone Bituminous 
were not the result of shifting votes. The final votes in the case were 
identical to the initial votes in conference for each of the Justices. 185 
179. See id. at 704-34. 
180. In the aftermath of the Court's decision in Hodel v. Irving, Congress amended section 207 of 
the Indian Land Consolidation Act, but the Court subsequently invalidated the amended law as well 
on takings grounds. See Babbitt v. Youpee, S19 U.S. 234,237 (1997). 
181. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
182. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
183. Id. 
184 Id. at s06. 
18S. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Keystone Bituminous Coal, No. 8S-1092 (Nov. 14, 
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According to Blackmun's conference notes, the Chief acknowledged that 
one's approach to the case "depends on the point of view" because one 
could characterize the case either as merely a "9 %" deprivation or a 
deprivation of the right to mine 27 million tons of coal. 186 For Rehnquist, 
however, Pennsylvania Coal was controlling. Justice White was clearly 
the swing Justice on the Court for the case and while he voted at 
conference in favor of upholding the law, he also indicated that his view 
was tentative and he was "not fully at rest. ,,187 He seemed to distinguish 
Pennsylvania Coal on the ground that in the days of "John W. Davis" 
(the counsel for the coal company in I922), one "could not mine" but in 
light of new technology one "can mine.,,'88 White apparently closed his 
comments by saying that he would now vote to affirm the lower court's 
rejection of the takings claim, but that he would also wait and read the 
dissent in the case before finally voting. '89 Justice Scalia, as the junior 
Justice, spoke last and bluntly explained the reasons for voting to strike 
down the state law. He characterized Pennsylvania Coal as an "anchor" 
and the state law challenged in this case as "less a regulation than a rip-
off. [It] gives economic wealth to the surface owner."'9" 
As the senior Justice' in the majority, Justice Brennan in mid-
November assigned Justice Stevens the responsibility of drafting the 
opinion for the Court. 191 Stevens circulated in mid-February what 
Blackmun's clerk described as a "lengthy" draft that reflected a "lack of 
editing,,,'92 and Rehnquist circulated his dissent soon thereafter. Because 
the final versions of both were published less than a month later, on 
March 9, I987, the kind of internal struggle then occurring over Hodel v. 
Irving was apparently not repeated in Keystone Bituminous. Justice 
Blackmun's clerk did express, in a memorandum, some misgivings about 
the "length and lack of editing" of Stevens' draft majority opinion and 
"more serious[ly]" the possibility that "Justice White [who] was on the 
fence in this case ... may react adversely to such a lengthy opinion."'93 
But those fears were not realized. Whatever opening the Keystone 
Bituminous dissenters had to bring Justice White over to their side was 
not successfully exploited. 
The upshot was, in retrospect, the Court's publication in Keystone 
Bituminous of a most unlikely repudiation of Pennsylvania Coal given 
1986) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
186. [d. 
187. [d. 
188. ld. 
189. [d. 
190. ld. 
191. Docket Sheet, Keystone Bituminous Coal, No. 85-1092 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
192. Clerk Memorandum to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Keystone Bituminous Coal, No. 85-1092 
(Feb. II, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
193. [d. 
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the makeup of the Court at the time. Hence, while Justice Scalia and 
others were fighting over Hodel v. Irving, Justice Stevens had succeeded 
in persuading Justice White to join a potentially far more significant 
opinion in Keystone Bituminous, which preempted the Hodel v. Irving 
decision by two months. The only saving grace for the property rights 
movement was that it was hard to believe that there was in fact a stable 
majority on the Court for everything within Stevens' opinion for 
Keystone Bituminous. But, for Justice Stevens, who had lost his Court in 
Hodel v. Irving, Keystone Bituminous was a major accomplishment. 
3. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale 
v. County of Los Angeles (I9B7) 194 
In First English, the Court finally had the opportunity a majority of 
the Court had long sought to address-the regulatory takings remedy 
issue first raised, but not reached, in Agins and then again in San Diego 
Gas & Electric. No doubt for this reason, all nine Justices voted at 
conference to note probable jurisdiction and to hear the case on the 
merits. 195 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion for the 
Court in First English, essentially embracing Justice Brennan's dissenting 
opinion in favor of the property owners in San Diego Gas & Electric, 
elevating that opinion to the status of an opinion of the Court.,<j/i The 
First English Court ruled that because the Constitution by its own terms 
mandated the payment of "just compensation" for governmental takings 
of private property, when a government regulation was deemed a taking, 
the government had a choice: the government could either purchase the 
property by paying "just compensation," or the government could lift the 
offending regulation and pay "just compensation" for the temporary 
taking that occurred prior to the regulation's invalidation. '97 
The Court's opinion did, however, contain one surprise. Justice 
O'Connor did not join the Chief's opinion, which was instead joined by 
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, and (not surprisingly) Scalia. 
Justice O'Connor, like Justice Blackmun, joined parts of Justice Stevens' 
dissent. '<)8 The parts joined by O'Connor (and Blackmun) dissented on 
two grounds. The first was that there was clearly no regulatory taking in 
the case, and therefore, the case should have been dismissed on summary 
judgment, obviating any need to address the remedy issue. '99 The second 
ground was that the judgment should have been affirmed because the 
majority was agreeing with the state (California) courts that government 
194· 482 U.s. 304 (1987). 
195. Docket Sheet, First English, No. 85-1199 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
196. Compare First English, 482 U.S. at 314-22, with San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San 
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 646-61 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
197. 482 U.S. at 314-22. 
198. [d. at 322. 
199. [d. at 323-28. 
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could invalidate the regulation without having to purchase the property 
and the state courts had not yet reached the question of possible 
damages for a temporary taking.")() Neither O'Connor nor Blackmun 
joined the portions of Stevens' dissent that contended that due process 
rather than takings should govern the kind of claims at issue in First 
English, alleging "improperly motivated, unfairly conducted, or 
unnecessarily protracted governmental decisionmaking. ,,201 
The Blackmun Papers are revealing both because they cast further 
light on the views of several of the Justices, including the Chief, 
O'Connor, and Scalia. The conference notes, for instance, show that 
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not believe that the interim land use 
ordinance at issue in the case, which restricted reconstruction of a church 
retreat center and camp for handicapped children in a flood plain 
following its prior destruction by flood, amounted to a taking.202 The 
Chief Justice began the discussion of the case by stating that he "fe[lt] no 
taking here," but went on to explain why he also believed the Court 
could, as a matter of procedure, address the remedy issue while 
sidestepping the merits.2OJ Blackmun, alone, favored dismissing the case, 
with everyone else agreeing with the Chief that the remedy issue was 
properly before the Court, while not necessarily agreeing that reversal 
was warranted."},' 
Justice O'Connor argued in favor of affirmance, consistent with her 
subsequent vote to join Justice Stevens' dissent in part.'°5 The tenor of 
her comments was apparently quite emotional. She described the 
consequences of the case as "grave" while also stating that "this 
particular restriction is not a taking.",,>6 She also stated that she "share[d] 
Stevens' concerns about the interim" just after Stevens had informed the 
conference that there "need not be compensation for temporary taking" 
and any damages appropriate for such a temporary deprivation should be 
governed by a "higher standard" best left for the lower courts to consider 
in the first instance.2"7 But in one of the more remarkable points in all of 
the Blackmun Paper conference notes that I reviewed, Blackmun then 
reports that O'Connor said, "This is scary and I rise in alarm!,,208 In 
apparently characterizing the tenor of her comments, Blackmun writes 
200. [d. at 335-39. 
201. [d. at 339-41. 
202. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, First English, No. 85-II99 (Jan. 16,1987) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
203. !d. 
204 [d. 
205. [d. 
206. [d. 
207. [d. 
208. [d. 
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"very ~" and "screams. ,,'09 
While far less dramatic, even more surprising is that Justice Scalia at 
conference voted with O'Connor and Stevens to affirm and therefore 
was not in the majority."o According to Blackmun's conference notes, 
Scalia contended that the interim period did not amount to a taking, 
while also saying that he would not "go so far as the Solicitor General" 
(who argued broadly against a constitutionally compelled just 
compensation remedy) because that argument was "a disaster!"m Scalia 
said, like Stevens, that while "not a taking," such a temporary 
impairment "could be a deprivation of due process."m 
What the conference notes therefore reveal is that Justice Scalia was 
far from fully on board the property rights movement in all respects 
during his first term. Whether the Just Compensation Clause mandated a 
remedy of "just compensation" in damages for regulatory takings was a 
central element of the movement's constitutional claims. Yet, when first 
considering it, Scalia's reaction was to reject it. Scalia's reluctance was 
not, moreover, confined to the conference. The Chief Justice circulated 
his draft opinion in mid-February,'I3 one month after the January 1987 
conference, and he quickly obtained his Court. Justices Powell, Brennan, 
White, and Marshall all had joined his opinion for the Court within a few 
days.'I4 By contrast, Justice Scalia did not join the Chief Justice's opinion 
until more than three months later, on May 28, 1987, a few weeks after 
Justice Stevens circulated his dissent, which Blackmun and O'Connor 
joined in part.'I5 
209. [d. As previously described. a recent biography of Justice O'Connor suggests that Justice 
Blackmun was especially hostile to O'Connor, prone to denigrating her abilities, which may explain his 
tendency to describe her on this occasion and on others as merely emotional rather than analytical. See 
supra note 120. In other words, Blackmun's description may be more revealing about Blackmun than 
about O'Connor. 
210. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, First English, No. 85-1199 (Jan. 16,1987) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
21I. [d. 
212. /d. 
213. See Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, First 
English, No. 85-1199 (Feb. 19,1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
214. See Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, First 
English, No. 85-1199 (Feb. 19, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); Letter from Justice 
William J. Brennan Jr. to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, First English, No. 85-1199 (Feb. 20, 
1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); Letter from Byron R. White to Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist, First English, No. 85-1199 (Feb. 23, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); Letter 
from Thurgood Marshall to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, First English, No. 85-1199 (Feb. 24, 
1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
215. Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, First English, No. 
85-1199 (May 28, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); see Justice Stevens, 1ST Draft Dissent, 
First English, No. 85-1199 (May 6, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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The Blackmun Papers do not offer any hints as to the cause of 
Justice Scalia's change of heart. What seems most likely, however, is that 
by May of that Term, the ideological dividing lines were beginning to 
form around the regulatory taking issue and Justice Scalia chose a side, 
not content to straddle the issue like either Justice White or Justice 
O'Connor. If that is so, the likely trigger for Scalia's decision to embrace 
the property rights issue may well have been the final regulatory takings 
case of the Term, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,216 which was 
the first property rights case opinion for the Court authored by Scalia, 
discussed next. 
4. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (I987/,7 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission was the Court's final 
regulatory takings case of October Term 1986, argued on March 30, 
1987.218 Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court, which was not 
handed down until the last opinion day of the Term, June 26, 1987.219 The 
ruling was a significant win for property rights advocates, and especially 
welcome after their disappointing loss a few weeks before in Keystone 
Bituminous. Indeed, it was hard to square the reasoning of Keystone 
Bituminous with Nollan. Justice White, alone, was in the majority in the 
two cases and he wrote in neither one.220 
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Nollan upheld a takings 
claim brought against the California Coastal Commission.22I The 
Commission policy challenged by homeowners in the case allowed for 
the lifting of height restrictions on development along the Pacific coast in 
exchange for the landowner agreeing to provide the public with lateral 
access along the beach between the home and the ocean that was 
otherwise private property.222 The Court ruled that although the outright 
taking of a permanent public access requirement would be a per se 
taking, a permit condition requiring such access could pass constitutional 
muster if the condition substantially furthered the same governmental 
purposes as would have justified denial of the permit.223 
216. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
217. [d. 
218. U.S. Supreme Court Center, Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, http://www.justia.us/us/483/825/ 
index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2006). 
219. [d. 
220. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,472 (1987); Nollan, 483 U.S. 
at 826. The Court decided to hear Nollan apparently only after Justice Scalia requested that the case 
be relisted after initial conference. See Docket Sheet, Nollan, No. 86-133 (The Blackmun Papers, supra 
note 2). Ultimately, Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Powell voted to hear the case, which fell shy of the 
requisite four votes for review, except that both the Chief Justice and Justice White stated their 
willingness to "join 3" to supply the necessary vote for plenary review. See id. 
221. 483 U.S. at 841-42. 
222. [d. at 828. 
223. [d. at 836-37. 
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According to the majority, the constitutional flaw in Nollan was the 
absence of a sufficient nexus between the government interests being 
served by the height restriction and those being served by the exaction of 
public access to the beach.224 The Court found unpersuasive the 
Commission's claim that both the restriction and the exaction furthered 
the public interest in beach access, with the height restriction focusing on 
the public's visual access and the exaction providing instead for the 
public's physical access.225 In addition to Justice White, the Chief Justice, 
Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor provided Justice Scalia's opinion 
with the necessary majority.226 Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, 
which Justice Marshall joined.227 Justice Blackmun filed his own 
dissenting opinion228 as did Justice Stevens, though the latter's primary 
purpose was to chide Justice Brennan yet one more time for joining the 
majority's opinion in First English.229 
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court contained several elaborations 
especially promising to property rights advocates. First, the opinion 
rejected the government's argument that the fact that the landowners 
purchased the property after the Coastal Commission announced its 
policy defeated their takings claim, because they had notice and 
therefore no reasonable investment backed expectations to the contrary. 
The majority ruled that the government, simply by giving prior notice, 
could not so easily defeat an otherwise meritorious takings claim.230 The 
Court also rejected the argument that mere rational basis means-end 
review was all that was required in takings analysis, akin to due process 
and equal protection analysis. Relying on the Court's prior language in 
Agins to conclude that the regulation must "'substantially advance' the 
'legitimate state interest' to be achieved," the Court held that the 
exaction's substantive nexus to the purposes being served by the 
underlying development restriction must accordingly be more 
substantial. 23 1 
The Blackmun Papers for the Nollan case provide insight into the 
224. /d. at 837. 
225. [d. at 838. 
226. I d. at 826. 
227. Id. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
228. Id. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
229. See id. at 866-Q7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
I like the hat that Justice Brennan has donned today better than the one he wore in San 
Diego, and I am persuaded that he has the better of the legal arguments here. Even if his 
position prevailed in this case, however, it would be of little solace to land-use planners who 
would still be left guessing about how the Court will react to the next case, and the one after 
that. As this case demonstrates, the rule of liability created by the Court in First English is a 
shortsighted one. Like Justice Brennan, I hope that "a broader vision ultimately prevails." 
Id. at 867. 
230. /d. at 833 n.2. 
231. [d. at 834 n.3 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon. 447 U.S. 255. 260-62 (1980». 
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Court's deliberations. At conference, for instance, Justice Brennan 
described the case as "tough" and appears to have indicated that he 
might be voting for reversal (in favor of the landowner) before finally 
settling on affirmance in favor of the Coastal Commission. >3> Blackmun 
describes Brennan as having talked for a "long" time.>33 Justice Marshall 
at conference formally voted in favor of the landowner, saying matter of 
factly that the "State has a right to take but must pay. Simple.,,>34 Later, 
however, when the draft opinions were circulating, Marshall ended up 
switching positions and voting with Brennan in dissent.'35 
The most surprising part of Blackmun's conference notes is the 
suggestion that Scalia originally thought the challenged Coastal 
Commission exaction policy was "not a regulatory taking.,,>36 To be sure, 
the conference notes show Scalia voting for reversal in favor of the 
landowner, but not on takings grounds.>37 Justice Scalia reportedly 
described the state beach access exaction policy as "a gimmick.">38 He 
also contended that there "has to be a reasonable relationship" and that 
there should be "no balancing test. ,,>39 His antipathy for a balancing test 
in Nollan is consistent with his view then being expressed during the 
Court's simultaneous deliberations in Hodel v. Irving, in which he 
proffered a bright line takings test rather than a Penn Central multi-
factor analytical framework. >40 
As is evident from the final opinion for the Court authored by 
Scalia, the Justice at some point between the date of the conference 
(April I, 1987) and the final opinion he drafted for the Court decided to 
embrace the takings approach to the case. What is interesting is that in 
neither First English, described above, nor in Nollan, did Scalia initially 
believe it made sense to characterize the relevant constitutional problem 
as a "taking." He instead appears to have thought that the issue sounded 
more in due process than in takings. In both Nollan and First English, 
however, Scalia decided to embrace the takings approach fairly 
enthusiastically. He might have done so because he in fact changed his 
own mind in both cases, which would also explain why he finally decided 
in late May to join the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court in First 
English. Or, perhaps, Justice Scalia decided that as the author of the 
232. See Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Nollan, No. 86-133 (Apr. I, 1987) (The Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 2). 
233. [d. 
234 [d. 
235. Nollan,483 U.S. at 842. 
236. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Nollan, No. 86-133 (Apr. I, 1987) (The Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 2). 
237. [d. 
238. See id. 
239. [d. 
240. See infra text accompanying notes 163-{)4. 
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opinion for the Court in Nollan, it was his responsibility to reflect the 
views of the majority of the Justices, which relied on a takings label, 
rather than on whatever constitutional label he might have thought more 
apt were this a constitutional question of first impression:41 
5. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (I992r' 
When Justice Clarence Thomas joined the Court in 1992, the 
property rights movement had good reason to believe that the Court 
finally had a firm majority favorable to their interests. Justice Thomas 
had given speeches in the past that endorsed more aggressive protection 
of property rights under the federal Constitution. Indeed, for that reason, 
the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Joseph Biden, 
commenced Justice Thomas' confirmation hearings by questioning then-
Judge Thomas about his views on property rights and the possible impact 
of those views on the ability of government to regulate private 
property:43 
Soon after his confirmation, moreover, the Court seemed ready to 
do just what property rights advocates had hoped and government 
regulators had feared. Within the first few weeks of October Term 1991, 
the Court granted review in three different property rights cases raising 
the regulatory taking issue: PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez,244 Yee v. 
241. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Nollan does not, in any event, represent his finest 
work of opinion craftsmanship. This was the end of Scalia's first Term on the Court, and during the 
final few weeks it was quite clear that he was behind in his opinion assignments and having difficulty 
completing all of his work by the close of the Term. He filed four opinions for the Court during the 
final two days of the Term. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (filed on June 26, 1987); 
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (filed on June 26, 1987); Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635 (1987) (filed on June 25, 1987); U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 66g (1987) (filed on June 25, 
IgB7)· 
He also filed two additional opinions for the Court earlier in June. See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 
755 (1987) (filed on June 19, 1987); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Bd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 
U.S. 270 (1987) (filed on June 8, 1987). And, during the last two weeks of the Term, he also filed five 
dissenting opinions. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 394 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (filed on 
June 24, 1987); Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266,303 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (filed 
on June 23, 1987); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (filed June 23, 1987); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 
U.S. 578, 610 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (filed on June 19, 1987); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 
519 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (filed on June IS, 1987). 
The Nollan opinion, in particular, was oddly drafted. Unlike most majority opinions, which seem 
clearly to have been written before the circulation of any dissenting opinions, Scalia's opinion for the 
Court in Nollan makes almost all of its substantive points in lengthy response to Justice Brennan's 
dissent. Its peculiar nature may be why, in a memorandum to the Justice about the case, one of 
Blackmun's clerks wrote that "Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority might as well carry a disclaimer 
that the Court does its sloppiest work at the end of the year." Letter from Law Clerk to Harry A. 
Blackmun, Nollan, No. 86-133 (June 9,1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
242. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
243. See Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, I02d Congo rro-27 (1991). 
244. 502 U.S. 956 (1991). 
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City of Escondido ,245 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.246 The 
first two cases, however, largely fizzled when the Court, upon closer 
examination, realized that the constitutional issues were not well 
presented. The Court formally dismissed the writ as improvidently 
granted in PFZ Properties,247 and, while reaching the merits by rejecting 
other constitutional claims in Yee, concluded that the regulatory taking 
issue was not fairly presented by the case and accordingly declined to 
address it.'48 
Lucas was therefore the only one of the three regulatory takings 
cases to survive the Term intact. The facts of the case, as presented to the 
Court, seemed very sympathetic to the landowner, David Lucas, and for 
this reason, it is not surprising to learn that the members of the Court 
who voted to hear the case (the Chief Justice and Justices White, 
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas) were those most interested in 
establishing precedent favorable to property rights.249 The state law Lucas 
challenged prevented him from building a house (or any other 
permanent structure) on either of his two beachfront lots, even though 
houses had previously been built up and down the coastline on similarly 
situated property before the new development restrictions became 
effective.250 The trial court had found that the new development 
restrictions had rendered the property without any economic value and 
therefore constituted a taking, but the South Carolina Supreme Court 
had reversed, seemingly on little more than the fact that the restriction 
was a valid police power measure that furthered legitimate governmental 
interests.251 
When Justice Scalia announced the opinion for the Court in Lucas 
on the very last day of the Term in June, the ruling seemed to many to be 
the blockbuster for which the property rights movement had long hoped. 
Justice Scalia wrote, as he tends to do, with a fair amount of gusto, on 
this occasion stressing the important "historical compact recorded in the 
Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture.,,252 
The Court opinion immediately made clear that, notwithstanding the 
Stevens' opinion for the Court five years earlier in Keystone Bituminous, 
Pennsylvania Coal remained good law.253 The opinion also, notably, at 
245· 502 U.s. 905 (1991). 
246. 502 U.s. 966 (1991). 
247· PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 503 U.S. 257 (1992). 
248. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 532-33 (1992). 
249. Docket Sheet, Lucas, No. 91-453 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). Justice B1ackmun, 
however, also stated at conference his willingness to supply the fourth vote for jurisdiction, if 
necessary to grant review.ld. 
250. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008-09 (1992). 
251. /d. at lOOg--IO. 
252. Id. at 1028. 
253. Id. at 1014-15. The opinion noted, cryptically, that Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
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the outset of its analysis cited to a law review article written by 
University of Chicago law professor Richard Epstein, widely considered 
the intellectual fountainhead of the property rights movement.254 
Somewhat reminiscent of his unsuccessful draft opinion for the 
Court five years earlier in Hodel v. Irving, Justice Scalia's opinion for the 
Court in Lucas sought to eschew a Penn Central balancing approach in 
favor of a bright line test.'55 In particular, the Lucas opinion carved out of 
the Court's prior precedent a series of per se takings tests. For example, 
relying on Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Court held that a police power 
regulation that deprived a landowner of all "economically viable use" of 
the property constituted a taking.256 Scalia's Lucas opinion also offered a 
not-so-subtle rebuke of Andrus v. Allard, the case he sought to limit to 
its fact in Hodel v. Irving, in particular its reference to "profits" as being 
a "slender reed" upon which to base a takings claim. The Lucas opinion, 
by contrast proclaimed "'[F]or what is the land but the profits 
thereof[?]",257 
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's attempt in Lucas to move the Court 
to a bright line test, his opinion for the Court included a series of caveats 
that deprived the holding of some of its force. One footnote expressly 
admitted just that. It acknowledged that "[r]egrettably, the rhetorical 
force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater 
than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the 'property 
interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured.,,25 In that 
footnote, the opinion sought to cast some doubt on the ongoing validity 
of the Court's prior ruling in Penn Central that, in evaluating a takings 
claim, one looked to the "property as a whole" rather than the part most 
restricted by regulation.259 The Court's holding was also further muddled 
by the fact that the apparent critical trigger for the per se test-loss of all 
economically viable use-was alternatively phrased throughout the 
opinion, making even less clear what the trigger was in terms of the 
extent of remaining economic value, if any.260 
The most significant limitation within the opinion, however, was the 
majority's concession that there was an exception from the per se test for 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 472 (I987), had rejected a takings challenge to a state law "nearly 
identical" to the one struck down in Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. I04, 138 n.36 
(I978). Lucas, 505 U.S. at IOI6 n.7 (citations omitted). 
254· Lucas, 505 U.S. at IOI5. 
255. [d. 
256. [d. at IOI6. 
257. [d. at IOI7 (quoting I E. COKE, INSTITUTES ch. I, § I (1st Am. ed. I812)}. 
258. [d. at IOI6 n.7. 
259· See id. 
260. The Lucas opinion alternatively referred to the per se trigger as the absence of economically 
"beneficial," "productive," "feasible" use, leaving the property "economically idle," or without 
"economic value." See id. at IOI5-20, I034. 
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regulations that did no more than apply "background principles" of law, 
including nuisance law: 
Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed 
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the 
restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property 
and nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with 
such an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the 
result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent 
landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law 
of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to 
abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.26 
The majority elaborated that there would, under this formulation be 
no liability "for the destruction of 'real and personal property, in cases of 
actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire' or to forestall other 
grave threats to the lives and property of others.,,262 Nor would the owner 
of a lake bed 
be entitled to compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to 
engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect of flooding 
others' land. Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant, 
when it is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon 
discovery that the plant sits astride an earthquake faulr.>63 
The Lucas Court explained that while "[s]uch regulatory action may well 
have the effect of eliminating the land's only economically productive 
use, .. , it does not proscribe a productive use that was previously 
permissible under relevant property and nuisance principles.,,264 The 
majority opinion went on to cite to the Second Restatement of Torts 
provisions governing nuisance law.265 Because the Restatement is very 
open-ended in its potential reach and ultimately relies on a balancing 
test, this final acknowledgment dramatically undermined the significance 
of the supposedly per se approach that the Lucas majority opinion had 
announced a few paragraphs earlier. 
Because of the background principles and nuisance exception, the 
Lucas Court stopped short of formally ruling that the restriction on land 
use development in that case was a taking.266 The Court instead 
remanded back to the state courts to determine in the first instances what 
the applicable principles of state law were, including state nuisance law.2&) 
While thereby deferring to the state courts on a question of state law, the 
majority opinion left little doubt whether it believed those principles 
261. Id. at 1029. 
262. Id. at 1029 n.16. 
263. Id. at 1029. 
264 Id. at 1029-30. 
265. Id. at 103 I. 
266. [d. 
267. Id. at 1031-32. 
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could validly bar the landowner in Lucas from building his houses on his 
two lots. The Court added "[i]t seems unlikely that common-law 
principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable or 
productive improvements on petitioner's land; they rarely support 
prohibition of the 'essential use' of land.,,268 The Court also warned that 
states were not unfettered in their ability to announce "background 
principles" of state law capable of defeating a per se takings claim:69 
"[O]nly if an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents 
would exclude those beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the 
land is presently found" would a per se taking not be found:70 
The Chief Justice and Justices White, O'Connor, and Thomas joined 
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court.'71 Justice Kennedy concurred in the 
judgment only, adopting a very different analytical framework than that 
proffered by Scalia for the Court.'72 Kennedy advanced a "reasonable 
expectations" analysis and, seemingly in direct contradiction of the 
majority opinion, further contended that "[t]he common law of nuisance 
is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex 
and interdependent society.,,273 Explicitly recognizing the basis of much 
modern environmental law, Kennedy added that "[c]oastal property may 
present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can 
go further in regulating its development and use than the common law of 
nuisance might otherwise permit.,,274 Justice Souter neither concurred nor 
dissented. He filed a separate "statement" in which he contended that 
the Court should have dismissed the writ as improvidently granted in 
part because of the improbable nature of the district court's finding that 
the property that was the subject of the takings claim truly had no 
remaining economic value:75 
Much speculation surrounded the Court's opinion immediately 
afterwards. The way it was written, for instance, suggested the possibility 
that Scalia was working hard to hold on to his majority:76 That would 
explain why the opinion would announce a per se test in sweeping terms, 
but then just as quickly abandon it with caveats such as nuisance law that 
seemed to reintroduce into the takings analysis the very kind of 
balancing test and harmlbenefit analysis that the opinion purported to be 
rejecting. There was also reason to wonder why and how two relatively 
268. Id. at 1031 (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911». 
269. Id. 
270. /d. at 1032 n.18. 
271. [d. at 1005. 
272. [d. at 1032. 
273· [d. at 1034-35. 
274 /d. at 1035. 
275. [d. at 1076 (Souter, J.). 
276. See, e.g., Lazarus, Counting Votes, supra note 45, at II 18-19; Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the 
Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1426-27 (1993). 
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new Justices, Kennedy and Souter, had nonetheless failed to join the 
majority. Justice White was, as in October Term 1986, the decisive fifth 
vote. 
The Blackmun Papers here too tell a much fuller and richer story. At 
conference, the vote in favor of the landowner was not nearly as close or 
as divided as suggested by the final Court opinion. The conference vote 
had seven Justices in the majority and only two (Blackmun and Stevens) 
in dissent.277 In addition to the four members of the Court who ended up 
joining Scalia's final opinion for the Court, Justices Kennedy and Souter 
also voted for the landowner, without much qualification.278 Justice 
Kennedy asserted that he was "[with the Chief Justice]."279 The Chief had 
previously commented during conference deliberations that "this type of 
[regulation] is not [sufficient] to bring [in the] nuisance line of cases" and 
that a claim was "[available] in terms of [ the] just [compensation] cases, 
i.e., Penn Central.,,2&> Kennedy added that one "cannot write narrowly" 
and that the "A gins [language] is not correct and has [to be] 
explained. ,,281 In similarly voting for reversal, Justice Souter stated that 
"the [State] [Supreme Court] rule is wrong" and the case provided an 
opportunity "to begin to explain what we mean by a nuisance.,,282 Finally, 
Justice O'Connor stated at conference that this is a "very [important] 
case" and, while voting for the landowner, also added that "there is a 
public nuisance exception.,,283 According to O'Connor, the "[State] has to 
do [more]" to justify its development restriction.284 
Although the case was argued on March 2, Justice Scalia did not 
circulate his draft opinion until early June,285 three months later, leaving 
277. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Lucas, No. 91'453 (Mar. 4, 1992) (The Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 2). 
278. Id. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284 Id. 
285. Docket Sheet, Lucas, No. 91'453 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); Antonin Scalia, First 
Draft Majority Opinion, Lucas, No. 91'453 (June [ ], 1992) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
Justice O'Connor quickly joined the majority opinion in what she dubbed "this difficult case," while 
expressing some concern that his draft shifts the "burden of persuasion ... to the state." Letter from 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Antonin Scalia, Lucas, No. 91-453 (June 2, 1992) (The 
B1ackmun Papers, supra note 2). The Chief Justice joined the next day, while also asking Justice Scalia 
to "accommodate two relatively minor suggestions," including a more expanded discussion of the 
"'noxious use' line of cases" and an explicit reservation "with respect to the authority of government 
to destroy or damage property during the course of battle, or in some other comparable emergency, 
without having to pay compensat::m." Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice 
Antonin Scalia, Lucas, No. 91-453 (June 3, 1992) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
The final Court opinion reflects both these suggestions. See Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1022-23 (1992) ("It is correct that many of our prior opinions have suggested that 'harmful 
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relatively little time for further internal deliberations before the Court 
adjourned at the end of that same month. The Blackmun Papers contain 
little formal correspondence between chambers but the correspondence 
that does exist, along with the conference notes, suggest why and how 
Justice Scalia may have lost his seven-Justice majority. Justice Scalia's 
per se approach pushed Justice Kennedy away, as it did Justice Souter, 
both of whom would have likely joined an opinion that pursued 
something more akin to the Penn Central balancing approach mentioned 
by the Chief Justice during conference. Scalia's inclusion, on the other 
hand, of the extended discussion of background principles and nuisance 
law seems likely to have been in response to Justice O'Connor, who 
mentioned the need for a nuisance exception at conference.286 The 
majority opinion's explicit acknowledgment that restricting development 
in a flood hazard area would not be a taking also seems to have been 
directed to O'Connor's reported "alarm," emotionally expressed several 
years back during the First English conference, that it was not a taking to 
bar the reconstruction of a camp for handicapped children in a 
floodplain. 2s7 As late as three days before the final opinion was 
announced, Justice O'Connor was still writing Scalia about possible 
concerns with parts of the opinion.288 
In sum, there was a cost to Justice Scalia's decision to craft the 
majority opinion in a more aggressive way. He lost the votes of two of 
the newer (and more junior) Justices on the Court, both of whom had 
expressed a willingness to join a majority opinion in favor of the 
or noxious uses' of property may be proscribed by government regulation without the requirement of 
compensation. For a number of reasons, however, we think the South Carolina Supreme Court was 
too quick to conclude that that principle decides the present case."); id. at 1029 n.16 ("absolving the 
State (or private parties) of liability for the destruction of 'real and personal property, in cases of 
actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire' or to forestall other grave threats to the lives and 
property of others"). 
286. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Lucas, No. 91-453 (Mar. 4, 1992) (The Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 2). 
287. See supra text accompanying notes 205--Q9. During oral argument in First English, Justice 
O'Connor expressed her concern about allowing construction in a flood hazard area. See Official 
Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States at 26, First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (No. 85-II99) (questions 
posed by Justice O'Connor) ("[0]0 you think that local governments don't have authority to engage in 
flood control regulation? ... And does the church plan to rebuild on a flood plain where people have 
been killed?"). 
288. Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Antonin Scalia, Lucas, No. 91-453 (June 
26, 1992) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2) ("I notice that the second draft of Lucas now says, at 
page II, note 6, that Penn Central was 'unsupportable.' 1 hope you will consider taking this out, as 1 
am not prepared to disapprove of Penn Central as part of the resolution of this case. If you do not 
decide to remove it, please show me as joining all but note 6."); Letter from Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor to Justice Antonin Scalia, Lucas, No. 91-453 (June 26, 1992) (The Blackmun Papers, supra 
note 2) ("At your suggestion, I have reread note 6 and 1 now accept your explanation that the criticism 
is addressed only to a portion of the state court's holding in Penn Central. With that understanding I 
withdraw my request."). 
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landowner. The opinion instead relied on the vote, never fully explained 
by any of the papers, of Justice White, the oldest member of the Court by 
far and, accordingly, the most likely to leave the Court soon thereafter. 
In fact, Justice White resigned from the Court one year later, which 
immediately raised legitimate questions concerning the continuing 
vitality of Lucas. 
Even more importantly, whatever short term advantages might have 
been realized by the per se approach, Justice O'Connor's apparent 
insistence on a lengthy discussion of nuisance law, including the nuisance 
balancing test, seems to have rendered any such advantages no more 
than a Pyrrhic victory. The Lucas per se test was so narrowly drawn that, 
as established by subsequent case law, it almost never applies. The 
practical effect of its inapplicability is, ironically, to make lower courts 
less rather than more likely to find that a challenged regulation amounts 
to a regulatory taking. 2&} The natural tendency of courts is to ask, first, 
whether a regulation constitutes a per se taking under Lucas and, after 
concluding that it does not, to conclude quickly that the regulation is 
constitutional. In the Lucas per se world, the Penn Central analysis 
became a mere afterthought, akin to a rational basis review that lower 
courts equated with a finding of constitutionality. 
Had, by contrast, Justice Scalia been willing to embrace the kind of 
reasonable expectations analysis favored by Kennedy that Scalia abhors, 
the resulting precedent might well have proved more powerful and 
longstanding. Lower courts might well have taken note of the Court's 
willingness to use a balancing test to find a regulation to be an 
unconstitutional taking. And, following that lead, those same courts 
would likely have been more willing to do the same rather than to treat 
balancing approaches as necessarily toothless. Certainly, in other areas of 
law, ranging from abortion rights to the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination, conservative jurists have substantially 
furthered their agenda through incremental decisionmaking that, while 
less sweeping than overruling Roe v. Wade290 or Miranda v. Arizona,29 1 
use balancing tests in support of their preferred substantive outcome. In 
this manner, both a woman's right to obtain an abortion and a criminal 
defendant's ability to rely on her Fifth Amendment right against self-
289. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background 
Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVfL. L. REV. 321 (2005). Soon after Lucas was 
decided, I suggested the possibility of just this unintended result. See Lazarus, Putting the Correct 
"Spin" on Lucas, supra note 276, at 1427 ("But, because environmental protection laws almost never 
result in total economic deprivations, that categorical presumption will rarely apply. Instead, the 
negative implication of the category's nonapplicability will dominate the lower courts' takings 
analyses. These courts will likely apply the opposite presumption that no taking has occurred. "). 
290 . 410 U.S. II3 (1973). 
291. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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incrimination have been significantly curtailed since Roe and Miranda,'92 
although the cases themselves remain formally the law of the land. 
6. Dolan v. City of Tigard (I994Y93 
Dolan v. City of Tigard was the last regulatory takings case decided 
by the Court during Justice Blackmun's tenure. He left the Court at the 
close of October Term 1993, soon after Dolan was decided. The Dolan 
case was a sequel in many ways to the Nollan case because, like Nollan, 
the regulatory takings issue arose in the context of a challenge to a 
permit condition rather than, as in a case like Lucas or Agins, a challenge 
to the underlying land use restriction itself. In Dolan, the City of Tigard 
was conditioning a permit to allow the owner of a plumbing and 
hardware store to double the size of the existing store and to expand and 
pave the store parking lot. The proposed permit conditions were 
designed to address the increased traffic and risk of flooding that would 
be caused by such a commercial expansion. The city contended that the 
proposed expansion would result in additional traffic from more 
customers and increased risk of floods because the related construction 
would increase the amount of impermeable surface area and therefore of 
runoff. The conditions, accordingly, required dedication of land for (I) a 
public greenway along a creek to minimize flooding, and (2) a 
bicycle/pedestrian pathway in order to relieve traffic congestion in the 
area.'94 The Oregon Supreme Court had rejected the takings claims.'95 
In an opinion written by the Chief Justice, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Court first held that 
the permit conditions did not suffer from the same constitutional flaw 
present in Nollan because they sought to serve the same legitimate 
ends - flood prevention and traffic congestion - furthered by the 
underlying development restriction. The Nollan nexus requirement was 
therefore met.'!)6 The constitutional infirmity, in the Court's opinion, 
related instead to whether the degree of exactions being demanded by 
the city was "rough[ly] proportional[]" to the projected impact of the 
proposed development.'97 The Court ruled that the city had not met its 
burden of proof with regard to either of the permit exactions. In 
particular, the city had failed to demonstrate why a private as opposed to 
a public greenway would not equally satisfy the risk of flood,'98 nor had 
the city demonstrated adequately that the proposed bicycle/pedestrian 
292. See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 
U.S. 490 (1989). 
293· 512 U.S. 374 (1994)· 
294 Id. at 37<)-83. 
295. Id. at 383. 
296. Id. at 386-88. 
297. Id. at 3<J0-9I. 
298. [d. at 392--95. 
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pathway would rather than merely could address the traffic hazard 
problem.299 Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined the 
Chief Justice's opinion. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, which 
Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg joined. Justice Souter also filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
The oral argument in Dolan was one of Blackmun's last. The 
argument was on March 23, I994, and Blackmun appeared two weeks 
later on April 6, I994, with President Clinton to announce his retirement 
at the end of that Term.3°O Based, however, on Blackmun's oral argument 
notes in Dolan, the argument was not one of the more scintillating. 
During argument for counsel for the City of Tigard, Blackmun wrote "I 
am fighting drowsiness again. ,,301 
Even though the Chief Justice, and not Scalia, wrote the opinion for 
the Court, Blackmun's conference notes show that Scalia here too 
pushed the writing in a manner that diminished the majority. At 
conference, those voting in favor of the property owner included all 
those who ended up in the majority in the final opinion, but the 
conference majority also included Justice Souter.302 Just like he had in 
Lucas, Justice Souter here too initially voted with the property owner, 
And, again, just as in Lucas, Souter left the majority and in Dolan 
dissented only after Justice Scalia in effect pushed him away. The only 
difference was that it was Scalia's own opinion for the Court in Lucas, 
and in Dolan it was the result of Scalia's persuading the Chief Justice to 
take a more aggressive stance that lost Souter's vote. 
At conference, the Chief Justice first announced his vote to reverse 
in favor of the landowner, explaining simply that the City "has to do 
[more] than [it did] here" to justify the exactions being imposed, 
although a "precise fit is not [necessary],"303 Justice O'Connor indicated 
that she "strongly" favored reversal and expressed concern with "what is 
going on in the communities!" and asserted that the "[state has the 
burden of proof].,,30 4 Justice Scalia stated that he was "[with the Chief 
Justice]," the "sky [would not] fall" if local government had to justify 
these kinds of exactions, and appeared to characterize what the City was 
doing here as "a shake-down."305 In explaining his vote for reversal, 
Justice Thomas discussed how with "Society you have to share [company 
299. [d. at 395-96. 
300. ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE-THE POLmcs OF RETIREMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 207--{)1) (2003). 
301. Harry A. Blackmun, Oral Argument Notes, Dolan, No. 93'518 (Mar. 23, 1994) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
302. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Dolan, No. 93-518 (Mar. 25, 1994) (The Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 2). 
303. [d. 
304- [d. 
305. /d. 
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to be] left alone and have peace. ,,306 Finally, Blackmun's notes are 
unfortunately limited about what Justice Souter said at conference. 
Other than describing the fact that Souter spoke "at length," the 
conference notes state only that Souter "wish[ed he] had confidence to 
[ affirm]. ,,3<>7 
The subsequent correspondence between the chambers, however, 
makes clear why Justice Souter subsequently shifted positions. On May 
12, 1994, the Chief Justice circulated the first draft of his opinion for the 
Court.3oB In that draft, Rehnquist decided to embrace a constitutional 
standard for exactions under the Takings Clause that was less rather than 
more demanding. While the state courts were divided concerning 
whether the condition must satisfy a "reasonable relationship" or a more 
demanding "substantial relationship" test to pass constitutional scrutiny, 
Rehnquist decided to adopt the "reasonable relationship" approach 
while concluding that the City had not met its burden under that 
standard under the facts of this case.309 The draft opinion expressly 
stated: "We hold that a 'reasonable relationship' between the required 
dedication and the impact of the proposed development is sufficient for 
purposes of the federal Constitution.,,310 
Justice Scalia responded the next day with a letter to the Chief, with 
copies to all chambers, stating that while he "would like to join your 
opinion," he also had "several problems."311 He expressed concern that 
the "reasonabl[ e] relat[ionship]" test risked "watering... down" the 
"substantially advance" language of Agins.312 He accordingly proposed 
that the Chief Justice use a "'rough proportionality' or 'substantial 
proportionality'" standard instead because they would have the 
"advantage of emphasizing that it is indeed the extent, Draft at 10, or 
degree, Draft at 12, and not just the nature of the exactions that must pass 
muster.,,313 Scalia had several other suggestions related to the proposed 
proportionality standard. Finally, in addition to requesting that the Chief 
Justice eliminate a favorable reference to specific language from a state 
court ruling "that I cannot accept," Scalia also asked for either more 
discussion or elimination of the draft opinion language that provided that 
the "benefit conferred" by the regulatory scheme is relevant to the 
306. /d. 
307. /d. 
308. William H. Rehnquist, 1st Draft Majority Opinion, Dolan, No. 93-518 (May 12, 1994) (The 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
309. [d. at 15-16. 
3 ro. [d. at 16. 
311. Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Dolan, No. 93-518 
(May 13, 1994) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
312. [d. 
313. [d. 
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proportionality analysis?4 Justice Kennedy, in a follow-up letter to 
Rehnquist, generally endorsed Scalia's proposal, while acknowledging 
that the case was "difficult," and the need to "speak in somewhat general 
terms to allow the law to develop in the series of decisions that no doubt 
will arise in the wake of our holding here. ,,315 
Justice Souter, however, wrote a letter expressing his disagreement 
with Justices Scalia and Kennedy.316 While agreeing with Scalia that "the 
opinion should make clear that the nexus required involves a question 
both as to nature and as to degree," Souter stated that his own "view is 
much closer to the one reflected in your current draft" than to Scalia's 
proposal. He continued that he agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist (and 
Justice Stevens) "that the benefit conferred is an important part of [the] 
takings analysis" and that he would favor "plac[ing] the burden on the 
government entity to show that the burden is not grossly 
disproportionate to the burden being added by the proposed action by 
the private party as well as to the benefit being conferred on the private 
party." Finally, Souter made clear that he could "probably join an 
opinion using the 'reasonable relationship' test, but [was] wary of going 
any further," and that, as applied to this case, he agreed the public 
greenway easement may fail the test, and was willing to remand to 
require the City to make a better showing in support of the 
bicycle/pedestrian pathway.317 
Notwithstanding Justice Souter's concerns, the Chief did agree to 
modify his opinion in most of the ways preferred by Scalia. Rehnquist 
even agreed to eliminate the "benefit" language although he advised that 
"[t]his is an area I know something about from my own private 
practice."318 Apparently, in response to the Chief Justice's acquiescence 
to Scalia's request, which prompted the latter to join the opinion/19 
Souter declined to join the majority and went so far as to write in dissent 
instead.320 
C. SCALIA'S DELIBERATIVE ROLE 
The pattern in all of the regulatory takings cases covered by the 
Blackmun Papers is generally the same. Once Justice Scalia erased some 
initial doubts he appears to have harbored about the proper role of the 
314- /d. 
315. Letter from Justice Anthony Kennedy to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Dolan, No. 93-
SIB (May 16, 1994) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
316. Letter from Justice David H. Souter to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Dolan, No. 93-
SIB (May 17, 1994) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
317. [d. 
31B. Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Antonin Scalia, Dolan, No. 93-51B 
(May IB, 1994) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). 
319. /d. 
320. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 4II-14 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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Takings Clause, he pushed his colleagues to establish stronger precedent 
more protective of property rights and, to that end, he trumpeted bright 
line tests rather than balancing and more contextual analysis, as he has 
generally done in other areas of constitutional law. Indeed, Scalia pushed 
so hard that he frequently pushed away several Justices who might 
otherwise have been inclined to join a majority opinion in support of the 
takings claim. However, except on one occasion (Keystone Bituminous) 
when the upshot may have been a lost opportunity to convert a dissent 
into a majority opinion, none of Scalia's pushing appears to have resulted 
in a property owner losing in the Court. The result instead was narrow 
majorities and sometimes, as in Lucas, opinions that promised far more 
than they in fact delivered. 
One can, of course, disagree about whether these results make a 
Justice more or less effective. Some might, for instance, argue that a 
Justice who seeks to promote a specific ideological agenda of any kind 
should try to get as much as possible out of every case before the Court. 
That may mean pushing as far as possible while keeping the minimum 
five vote majority. Under that view, a unanimous or lopsided vote in a 
case is, in effect, a wasted opportunity. The author of the opinion should 
have taken the opinion even further-as far as possible without losing 
the majority-in order to spend strategically the voting capital presented 
by the case. 
My own view is quite different. First, as an institutional matter, the 
Justice who promotes division within the Court to further short term 
ideological ends often does the Court and the nation a disservice. To be 
sure, dissent can be extremely important, and not all cases need or 
should be unanimous. But neither should sharp dissent or narrow 
division be an aspiration. There is an incremental cost to the Court, in 
terms of the respect in which its rulings are held and the ability of the 
Justices to deliberate together in the kind of constructive way necessary 
to produce outstanding opinions. The Blackmun Papers make plain the 
value of such deliberations because of the enormous intelligence of the 
individual Justices and the breadth of experience and perspective they 
bring to their work. All nine Justices deliberating respectfully together 
produce far better opinions than small camps of chambers within the 
Court. Such a deliberative capacity is not inconsistent with respectful and 
even sharp dissent. But it can be broken down by efforts from within to 
maximize the differences to achieve immediate results or by affirmative 
appeals by individual Justices to those outside the Court to condemn the 
majority or certain members of the Court in exaggerated terms for their 
opposing views. In a letter to Chancellor Kent in 1837, Justice Joseph 
Story candidly explored the need for a Justice to strike a balance 
between the needs to express one's views and the needs of the Court as 
an institution: 
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While I continue on the Bench I shall on important occasions come out 
with my own opinions, for which I alone shall consider myself 
responsible. But I shall naturally be silent on many occasions from an 
anxious desire not to appear contentious, or dissatisfied, or desirous of 
weakening the influence of the Court.321 
There is also often a strategic disadvantage to the precedent 
produced by thin margins or splintered opinions. Even when those 
rulings establish binding precedent upon the lower courts, they 
frequently represent the kind of ruling that is of limited long term 
precedential significance. As in Lucas, compromises necessary to satisfy 
a single Justice with enormous leverage on a closely divided Court 
ultimately deprive the opinion of any true coherence. Or, also as 
epitomized by Lucas, the Justice doing the pushing misses an 
opportunity to bring into his fold for the longer term someone who might 
prove a long-term ally, but instead becomes a long-term protagonist who 
feels no attachment to the ruling announced. 
The Blackmun Papers create a strong impression that Justice Scalia 
has chosen the more divisive strategy. Whether in writing his own 
opinions for the Court or lobbying another Justice charged with that 
responsibility, Scalia appears to push hard from within. Nor is he at all 
reticent to take another Justice to task for failing to embrace Scalia's 
view of legal doctrine. He is a sharp and often barbed critic/" well 
known for producing the kinds of turns of phrases that capture the 
attention of the news media and sympathetic commentators outside the 
Court. The words he uses seem not so much intended to persuade future 
Justices in future cases as to hold up for condemnation, sometimes even 
ridicule, his colleagues, by the general public.323 Ironically, those he seems 
321. WARD, supra note 300, at 62 (quoting Correspondence from Joseph Story to Chancellor Kent, 
June 26, 1837 (brackets omitted». 
322. See generally MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DMOEO: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 61-66 (2005). 
323. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 60? (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation's moral standards-and in the 
course of discharging that awesome responsibility purports to take guidance from the views 
of foreign courts and legislatures. Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth 
Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be 
determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded 
foreigners, I dissent. 
[d.; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 338 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Seldom has an opinion of this 
Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members."); Wabaunsee County 
v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What secret knowledge, one must 
wonder, is breathed into lawyers when they become Justices of this Court, that enables them to discern 
that a practice which the text of the Constitution does not clearly proscribe, and which our people 
have regarded as constitutional for 200 years, is in fact unconstitutional?"); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620,636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the 
resolution favored by the elite class from which the Members of this institution are selected, 
pronouncing that "animosity" toward homosexuality, ante, at 634, is evil. I vigorously dissent."); 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. SIS, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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to denounce most strongly are those whose votes he needs the most-
members of the Court, such as Justice O'Connor, whose abandonment of 
conservative jurisprudence he believes to be the most indefensible.324 
At least in the area of regulatory takings, however, there is reason to 
believe that Justice Scalia's approach has slowed rather than promoted 
the success of the property rights movement since he joined the Court. 
As described below, the Court's precedent since Justice Blackmun left 
the Court suggests that the state of the law is increasingly less rather than 
more favorable to the constitutional claims of property rights advocates. 
Justice Scalia's decision not to promote a strategy within the Court of 
reaching out to others to create stronger, broader coalitions, has led to a 
marked weakening of the precedent that he has trumpeted or created. It 
has produced per se rules that reflect his preferred approach but rules 
that because of their narrow applicability unwittingly make it harder, not 
easier, for property rights advocates to prevail. 
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE SUPREME COURT AFTER BLACKMUN: 
THE SCALIA BACKLASH 
Since Justice Blackmun left the Court in 1994, the Court has ruled in 
several regulatory takings case. But rather than demonstrate a steady 
expansion or even entrenchment of the Court's rulings favorable to 
property rights in NoLLan, Lucas, or Dolan, the overall trend has been 
just the opposite. The Court's opinions have been generally more 
favorable to government regulators, and they have made it more difficult 
for property rights advocates to prevail on their constitutional claims. On 
those occasions where property rights claims won, moreover, the 
precedent that was established was far less expansive than they had 
That system is destroyed if the smug assurances of each age are removed from the 
democratic process and written into the Constitution. So to counterbalance the Court's 
criticism of our ancestors, let me say a word in their praise: They left us free to change. The 
same cannot be said of this most illiberal Court, which has embarked on a course of 
inscribing one after another of the current preferences of the society (and in some cases 
only the counter-majoritarian preferences of the society's law-trained elite) into our Basic 
Law. Today it enshrines the notion that no substantial educational value is to be served by 
an all-men's military academy-so that the decision by the people of Virginia to maintain 
such an institution denies equal protection to women who cannot attend that institution but 
can attend others. Since it is entirely clear that the Constitution of the United States-the 
old one - takes no sides in this educational debate, I dissent. 
[d.; Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 5Il, 518-19 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("That is not merely a 
waste of research time and ink; it is a false and disruptive lesson in the law."); Schad v. Arizona, 501 
U.S. 624,651 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Unless we are here to invent a Constitution rather than 
enforce one, it is impossible that a practice as old as the common law and still in existence in the vast 
majority of States does not provide that process which is 'due. "'); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 
U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("that the point at which life becomes 'worthless,' and the 
point at which the means necessary to preserve it become 'extraordinary' or 'inappropriate,' are 
neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of this Court any better than they 
are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory"). 
324. BlsKuPlc, supra note 120, at 278-97. 
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hoped. By the close of the Court's most recent Term in June 2005, the 
Court had either substantially cut back or entirely eliminated both of the 
two-prongs of the takings test that Justice Powell established in Agins in 
1980 and that Justice Scalia had sought to promote and expand into per 
se tests in Nollan in 1987 and Lucas in 1992. 
A. SUITUM V. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY (1997)325 
The Court's ruling in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in 
1997 would seem a clear example of a property rights victory that was a 
disappointment. The case, even more than Lucas, presented a factual 
backdrop that underscored well the plight of owners of private property 
subject to very stringent environmental restrictions on development. The 
landowner in the case, Bernadine Suitum, owned property on land 
surrounding Lake Tahoe that she and her husband had purchased to 
build their "dream home." Land in the Lake Tahoe Basin had been 
subject to a series of increasingly stringent land use plans over time as 
the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) sought to regulate 
development to limit the amount of sediment runoff into the Lake. 
Those who built before the development restrictions became more 
stringent were able to build homes on parcels of land that would have 
been barred under the TRPA plan as finally adopted.326 
The Suitums were not able to build before the tougher restrictions 
became effective, and under the new land use plan, their parcel was 
deemed too susceptible to increased sediment runoff to allow for 
residential development. The comprehensive land use plan, however, 
provided for so-called "transferable development rights" (TDRs) to 
parcels such as the Suitum's, which could be applied to allow for greater 
residential development than otherwise permitted on other less 
environmentally sensitive parcels in the Tahoe Basin. Under that plan, 
the Suitums received some TDRs as a matter of right, based on the 
restrictions imposed on their own parcels and others for which they were 
eligible to apply. With the TRPA's approval, the Suitums could either 
apply the TDRs themselves to other property they owned in the area or 
sell them to other property owners seeking to develop eligible property. 
Reportedly just before he died, however, Mrs. Suitum's husband insisted 
that she not simply sell the property, but instead build the home there 
that they had always wanted. 
Unable to build, Mrs. Sui tum brought a section 1983 regulatory 
takings claim in federal court.327 The lower courts, however, dismissed 
325. 520 u.s. 725 (r997). 
326. [d. at 728-31; Richard J. Lazarus, Litigating Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in the 
United States Supreme Court, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVfL. L. 179, 184-86 (1997) [hereinafter Lazarus, 
Litigating Sui tum ]. 
327. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 728-31. 
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her claim for lack of ripeness. The trial court ruled that it could not 
assess the extent to which the land use restrictions had interfered with 
Mrs. Suitum's property rights until she had applied for and sought to sell 
her TDRs. Only then could the value of the TDRs be known and, 
therefore, the economic impact of the development restrictions be 
assessed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that until Suitum had 
applied to transfer her TDRs, there had been no "final decision" in the 
application of the regulations to her property, as required for a ripe 
takings claim.328 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, ruling that Suitum's 
takings claim was clearly ripe.329 She did not have to apply for or 
otherwise seek to obtain or sell TDRs to bring her takings claim. But the 
opinion for the Court, written by Justice Souter, provided a far less 
significant win for property rights advocates than they had hoped. First, 
the Court reaffirmed the validity of the "final decision" ripeness 
requirement that several amici supporting Suitum had sought to use the 
case to narrow.330 Second, while ruling that Suitum's suit was not barred 
by ripeness, the Court did so on narrow, case specific grounds. The Court 
held nothing more than that the TDR application was not a necessary 
part of a final decision when, as in Suitum, it was undisputed that the 
TRPA had finally determined that Suitum's parcel was in a zone in which 
development would not be permitted. She need not do anything more to 
establish a record of decision establishing the value of any TDRs to 
which she might be entitled under the plan.331 
Even more significantly, the Court declined to reach the potentially 
much more important second question presented in the case, which was 
the relevancy of the value of the TDRs to Suitum's takings claim.332 
Relying on language in Penn Central, the TRPA argued that the value 
was relevant to the threshold question whether the land use restriction 
amounted to a taking. For that reason, the TRPA further argued that the 
value of the TDRs took the case out of the Lucas per se rule, because 
they showed that she had not been deprived of all "economically viable 
use" of her property.333 Suitum's response was that because the TDRs did 
not amount to a "use" of her property, Lucas clearly applied, and that 
the value of the TDRs was relevant only to the question whether she had 
received "just compensation" for the taking of her property.334 
328. Id. at 731-33; Lazarus, Litigating Suitum, supra note 326, at 182-84; see also Suitum v. Tahoe 
Reg'l Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1996). 
329. 520 U.S. at 744. 
330. Id. at 735-41. 
331. /d. at 742-45. 
332. Id. at 728. 
333. Lazarus, Litigating Suitum, supra note 326, at 199-201. 
334 Id. at 195-99. 
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This second issue was far more significant than the ripeness 
"finality" issue because of its portent for the reach of Lucas and the use 
of techniques such as TDRs.335 Souter's opinion for the Court declined to 
reach the issue at all, which environmentalists and government regulators 
considered very good news. Justice Scalia, in a separate concurring 
opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, faulted the majority 
for failing to reach the TDR issue by assuming that their value was 
relevant to the threshold taking issue.336 His separate concurrence also 
took explicit account of the potential relevance of the TDR valuation 
issue to property rights claims: "taking [TDRs] into account in 
determining whether a taking has occurred will render much of our 
regulatory takings jurisprudence a nullity.,,337 
For that same reason, however, it is all the more striking that Souter, 
and not Scalia, had the opinion assignment in the case. The most likely 
scenario is that the Chief Justice, as the senior Justice in the majority, 
assigned the opinion to Souter in the first instance.338 To be sure, many 
factors go into opinion assignments, especially ensuring rough equity in 
numbers of Court opinions between Chambers, but the difference 
between a Souter assignment and a Scalia assignment was potentially 
quite huge. Souter, after all, had strongly disagreed with Scalia in both 
Lucas and Dolan, so much so that he ended up not joining the majority 
opinions in either case. The clear implication of the opinion assignment 
was that Souter would write the kind of narrow opinion that Scalia would 
disfavor, which is exactly what Souter did. 
If given the opinion assignment, Scalia might well have been able to 
draft an opinion favorable to property rights advocates on the second 
TDR issue, but it would undoubtedly have been a sharply divided Court. 
Because Scalia's concurring opinion in Suitum garnered three votes 
(including his own) and Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central strongly 
suggests his agreement with Scalia on the irrelevancy of TDR value to 
the threshold taking issue,339 Scalia would presumably have needed to 
sway only one more Justice, most likely Kennedy. The Chief Justice 
decided against giving Scalia that opportunity. Rehnquist might have 
done so for many reasons, including the possibility that there was in fact 
335. [d. at 20()-QI. 
336. Suitum. 520 U.S. at 745-50. 
337. [d. at 750. 
338. Of course, it is alternatively possible, in theory, that Scalia had the initial opinion assignment, 
but lost his Court for the broader ruling, and was relegated to a concurring opinion. Such an 
alternative scenario seems extremely unlikely. Neither the structure of the majority and concurring 
opinions nor the amount of time between argument and decision suggests that there was a change in 
authorship. 
339. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 150-52 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
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another case about which Scalia strongly preferred to write.340 Whatever 
the reason, the result was a case that ultimately did very little to promote 
the property rights agenda. 
B. PALAZZOLO V. RHODE ISLAND (2001)341 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, decided by the Court in 2001, was 
another regulatory takings case won by the landowner, but the Court's 
opinion portended a possible unraveling of the precedent that Scalia had 
established in favor of property rights in Lucas. At issue in Palazzolo 
was whether a landowner who purchased property after development 
restrictions were effective could subsequently bring a meritorious 
regulatory takings challenge against those same regulations.342 The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court had ruled that the takings claim must fail. 343 
The court ruled, first, the takings suit was not ripe because the landowner 
had not received a "final decision" regarding how the property could be 
used.344 In light of its threshold ruling on ripeness, the state court could 
have ended its opinion there, but the court went on to explain that the 
landowner had no right to challenge as takings the application of 
regulations that became effective prior to his legal ownership of the 
property in question.345 According to the court, that fact alone would 
defeat even a Lucas claim based on total economic deprivation because 
the land use restrictions being applied would constitute "background 
principles" of law under the Lucas exception to its own per se rule.346 The 
court also added that the factual premise of Palazzolo's Lucas per se 
taking claim, in all events, lacked merit because its use was contradicted 
by undisputed evidence that he had $200,000 in development value 
remaining on an upland parcel of the property.347 Finally, the state 
supreme court elaborated that Palazzolo was further precluded from 
making a meritorious claim under Penn Central, for reasons analogous to 
why a Lucas claim would lack merit under the "background principles" 
340. Scalia's opinion assignment that month was instead to author the opinion for the Court in a 
case raising the question whether Congress had authorized the Secretary of Transportation to appoint 
civilian members of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, and if so, whether this authorization 
is constitutional under the Appointments Clause of Article II. Edmonds v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 
(1987). The Court was unanimous, except that Souter declined to join part of the Court opinion, and 
filed a separate concurrence. Id. at 666. Faculty colleagues commenting upon an earlier draft of this 
Article, and more familiar with the Appointments Clause issue at stake in Edmonds, believe that 
Scalia may well have harbored significant interest in writing the Edmonds opinion because it provided 
him with an opportunity to limit the Court's prior opinion in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), 
from which he dissented (id. at 697). See Edmonds, 520 U.S. at 661-{i5. 
341. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
342. Id. at 611. 
343. Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000). 
344. Id. at 712-15. 
345. Id. at 716. 
346. Id. 
347. Id. at 715. 
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exception to the per se rule-because he became the lawful owner of the 
land after the land use restrictions became effective, he could have had 
no "reasonable investment-backed expectations" that were adversely 
affected by this regulation.348 . 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy 
that, like Suitum, rejected once again the government's threshold 
ripeness argument.349 But the landowner's victory included in it a lot of 
longer term bad news for the property rights movement. First, the Court 
held that the landowner's Lucas challenge in all events lacked merit 
because there was clearly some economic value to at least one part of his 
property.350 The Court declined the opportunity, urged by the landowner 
and numerous supporting amici briefs, to conclude that the Lucas per se 
test was triggered to the extent that any part of the property was subject 
to a complete prohibition on development.351 Second, Kennedy's opinion 
for the majority stopped short of embracing the landowner's argument 
that the existence of development restrictions at the time of purchase was 
wholly irrelevant to the takings inquiry. The majority concluded only 
that the state supreme court was wrong in saying that their existence 
automatically precluded a takings claim.352 
Even more portentously, Justice O'Connor both joined the majority 
opinion and wrote separately to make clear her view that the existence of 
development restrictions at the time of purchase most certainly would be 
relevant to takings analysis under Penn Central. "[T]he regulatory regime 
in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to 
shape the reasonableness of those expectations. ,,353 Because it was 
already fairly clear that Justice Kennedy thought the same based on his 
concurring opinion in Lucas, O'Connor's opinion left no doubt that a 
solid majority of at least six Justices were ready to jettison Lucas as a 
leading case for takings analysis.354 Instead, Justice Brennan's opinion for 
348. [d. at 717. 
349. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
350. The Court nonetheless did remand the case back to the lower courts for further proceedings 
to allow the landowner to argue that the development restrictions amounted to a taking under the 
Penn Central balancing test. [d. at 632. The state trial court recently ruled that the landowner's claim 
lacked any merit under Penn Central, relying primarily on the absence of landowner reasonable 
investment backed expectations to develop the property in light of its physical characteristics 
(approximately one-half was below mean high water) and public nuisance law. See Palazzolo v. State, 
No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *1 (R.I. Super. July 5,2005). 
351. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 38-41, Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606 (No. 99-2047); Brief of the 
Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 26-29, Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606 (No. 
99-2047); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Farm Bureau Federation and Rhode Island Farm 
Bureau in Support of Petitioner at '3-15, Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606 (No. 99-2047). 
352. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-30. 
353. [d. at 633. 
354. The dissenting (and partially concurring) opinions filed and/or joined by Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, make clear their view that pre-existing laws are relevant to, and tend to defeat, 
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the Court in Penn Central, long resisted by Scalia, seemed destined to 
become, as Justice O'Connor now proclaimed, the "polestar" for the 
Court in takings cases.355 
Justice Scalia also wrote separately in Palazzolo, but now for the 
purpose of taking deliberate and harsh aim at O'Connor, who ten years 
earlier had supplied him with one of his five votes in Lucas. Scalia 
minced no words in his challenge: "I write separately to make clear that 
my understanding of how the issues discussed in Part II-B of the Court's 
opinion must be considered on remand is not Justice O'Connor's.,,356 But, 
what was becoming clear in light of Palazzolo was that Scalia had not 
just parted ways with O'Connor, he had lost the Court that he had once 
had in Nollan, Lucas, and to a certain extent in Dolan. 
C. TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL V. TAHOE REGIONAL 
PLANNING AGENCY (2002Y57 
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, Justice Stevens took full advantage of the table laid for him by 
Justice Scalia and turned it over. Stevens, who had been essentially 
relegated to a series of dissents, including in Lucas, took back the Court, 
and Scalia found himself in dissent with little left of his opinion for the 
Court in Lucas. 
The sole issue in Tahoe-Sierra was whether a complete ban on 
development during a thirty-two month moratorium for the purpose of 
developing a comprehensive land use plan amounted to a per se Lucas 
taking of property in the absence of "just compensation." The taking 
claimed would, akin to the kind of taking described by the Court in First 
English, be a temporary taking limited to the time that the development 
moratorium was in effect. The landowners' legal arguments essentially 
sought to marry the best parts from their perspective of First English, in 
terms of temporary takings, with Lucas, in terms of a per se analysis. 
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the argument in a sweeping 
opinion written by Justice Stevens for the Court, joined by Justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Neither Kennedy 
nor O'Connor wrote separately. No doubt to achieve just that end, the 
Stevens Court opinion borrows generously from the prior writings of 
both O'Connor and Kennedy, with numerous verbatim quotations. The 
upshot is an opinion that dramatically limits the reach of Lucas and, akin 
to Kennedy's "reasonable expectations" analysis in Lucas and 
takings claims by undermining the possible reasonableness of a landowner's development 
expectations. See id. at 637-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); id. at 645-55 
(Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter and Breyer, J.J., dissenting); id. at 654-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
355· Id. at 633. 
356. Id. at 636. 
357· 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
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O'Connor's balancing analysis in Palazzolo, completely rebuffs Scalia's 
basic per se approach to takings law: 
Our jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings is as 
old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves the straightforward 
application of per se rules. Our regulatory takings jurisprudence, in 
contrast, is of more recent vintage and is characterized by "essentially 
ad hoc, factual inquiries," ... designed to allow "careful examination 
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances. ,,358 
The Tahoe-Sierra case also appeared to put to rest Scalia's attempt, 
commenced in Lucas,359 to have the Court revisit the Penn Central ruling 
that takings analysis must consider the "parcel as a whole,,360 and not just 
focus on the part of a landowner's property that is most burdened by 
regulation. As the Court acknowledged in Lucas,361 the significance of the 
Lucas per se test is ultimately entirely dependent on how one defines the 
subject property. If one focuses just on the part of the property that is 
most burdened or just on a time period when the property is most 
burdened, one is more likely to find that there is a complete economic 
deprivation. But, if one looks to the parcel as a whole physically and/or 
temporally, one will rarely ever find such an economic wipeout. Such 
blanket, permanent prohibitions almost never happen. In Tahoe-Sierra, 
the Court ruled that one must look to the parcel as a whole both spatially 
and temporally.362 Under that approach, there will almost never be the 
permanent elimination of all economic value necessary to trigger Lucas. 
Finally, the Tahoe-Sierra majority likewise rejected the efforts of 
property rights advocates to expand the reach of the Lucas per se takings 
test by not having its application strictly tied to complete wipeouts of all 
economic value. Stevens' opinion for the Court made plain that the 
Lucas "holding was limited to 'the extraordinary circumstance when no 
productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted. ",363 The 
categorical rule does "not apply if the diminution in value [is] 95 % 
instead of IOO%.,,364 Hence, "[a]nything less than a 'complete elimination 
of value,' or a 'total loss,' the Court acknowledged, would require the 
kind of analysis applied in Penn Central. ,,365 
358. 535 U.S. at 325 (citations omitted). Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in Tahoe-Sierra 
quotes or cites specifically to opinions authored by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy six and three 
times, respectively. 
359. Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). 
360. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). 
361. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. 
362. 535 U.S. at 331-32 ("An interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds that 
describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years that describes the temporal aspect of the 
owner's interest. See Restatement of Property §§ 7-9 (1936). Both dimensions must be considered if 
the interest is to be viewed in its entirety. "}. 
363. Id. at 333 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017). 
364 Id. at 333 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8). 
365. Id. at 333 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019-20 n.8). 
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In sum, Tahoe-Sierra represented a major repudiation of what had 
been widely perceived as Justice Scalia's single greatest achievement on 
behalf of the property rights movement: his opinion for the Court in 
Lucas converting Justice Powell's reference in Agins to "economic 
viability" and creating a per se takings test. But what proved Lucas's 
undoing was the opinion's lack of internal coherence and careful 
craftsmanship and Scalia's failure in Lucas and in subsequent cases to 
build alliances with other members of the Court. After Tahoe-Sierra, 
Lucas was largely relegated to its peculiar facts: a complete economic 
wipeout with no remaining economic value.366 Because, moreover, hardly 
anyone believed those presumed facts to be true even in Lucas itself-
because of the value such beachfront property inevitably has to 
neighboring landowners seeking to increase the lot size for their own 
pre-existing homes-its precedential reach became almost a nullity.367 
D. LINGLE V. CHEVRON U.S.A. INC. (2005)368 
Just this past Term, the Court followed up on Tahoe-Sierra with yet 
another sweeping rule that cut back yet again on the property rights 
movement's prior gains before the Court. While Scalia had based Lucas 
on the second "economic viability" prong of the takings test announced 
by the Court in Agins,36<] he had used the first prong of Agins to justify the 
heightened means-ends analysis he had established for the Court in 
Nollan and had pushed the Chief Justice to adopt for the Court in 
Dolan.370 The first Agins prong stated that a land use regulation amounts 
to an unconstitutional taking if it fails to "substantially advance a 
366. The "background principles" caveat has, moreover, increasingly been transformed into a 
powerful categorical defense to takings claims. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 289, at 321. 
367. Lucas, 50S U.S. at 1033-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
The South Carolina Court of Common Pleas found that petitioner's real property has been 
rendered valueless by the State's regulation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37. The finding appears 
to presume that the property has no significant market value or resale potential. This is a 
curious finding, and I share the reservations of some of my colleagues about a finding that a 
beachfront lot loses all value because of a development restriction. 
[d. (citations omitted). One of the more interesting documents in the Blackmun Papers relates to the 
question whether the landowner David Lucas had really been deprived of all economic value in his 
property as a result of the restrictions on development imposed on his two parcels. In a memorandum 
to the Justice written by one of Justice Blackmun's clerks in anticipation of the oral argument in the 
case, the clerk noted: "There is something fishy about this case." Clerk Memorandum to Justice Harry 
A. Blackmun, Lucas, No. 91-453 (Feb. 28, 1992) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). The clerk 
strongly intimated that the very high prices that David Lucas reportedly paid for the property, prior to 
the restrictions, reflected the property's actual market value. She suspected that the reported increases 
in appreciation prior to his purchase were "too much to be believed," but were more likely the result 
of "speculative churning to raise the price," and, because Lucas was intimately involved in the real 
estate development in the area, "[ilt also seems very odd that someone who was in on the island's 
development from the start would wait to buy the last lots at the highest prices." [d. 
368. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
369. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
370. See supra text accompanying notes 3II-1S. 
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legitimate governmental goal.,,37' Scalia had invoked the "substantially 
advance" test in his opinion for the Court in Nollan to justify the ruling 
that the nexus requirement application to permit condition exactions was 
more stringent than mere rational basis review typically invoked in due 
process or equal protection challenges to economic legislation.372 He did 
so again in Dolan in his letter to Chief Justice Rehnquist, which 
successfully persuaded him to require more than a "reasonable 
relationship" between the degree of exactions being demanded by the 
City and the projected impact of the proposed development that justified 
governmental regulation in the first instance.373 The Ninth Circuit had, 
following Justice Scalia's lead, embraced the property rights movement's 
even more far reaching argument that the Takings Clause demanded a 
heightened means-end analysis for all governmental restrictions on 
private property, wholly outside the context of permit exactions.374 
In Lingle, however, the Court in an opinion written by Justice 
O'Connor unanimously rejected the "substantially advance" language 
that it had, also unanimously, endorsed in Agins. The Court was candid 
in acknowledging its prior error: "On occasion, a would-be doctrinal rule 
or test finds its way into our case law through simple repetition of a 
phrase-however fortuitously coined."375 But the Court also made clear, 
in no uncertain terms that the '''substantially advances' ... prescribes an 
inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, and that it has 
no proper place in our takings jurisprudence. ,,376 
Even the care that the Lingle Court took to make clear that it was 
not disturbing either Nollan or Dolan will likely have just the opposite 
effect.377 The Court's assertion that its "decision should not be read to 
disturb these precedents" was on a narrow reading of both cases.378 As 
described by the Court, "the rule [Nollan and Dolan] established is 
entirely distinct from the 'substantially advance' test we address today" 
because "Nollan and Dolan both involved dedications of property so 
onerous that, outside the exactions context, they would be deemed per se 
physical takings. ,,379 The irony of the Court's preservation of Nollan and 
371. Agins, 447 U.s. at 260. 
372. See NoHan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.3 (1987). 
373. Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Dolan, No. 93-518 
(May 13, 1994) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2) ("Elsewhere, however, Nollan pointed out that 
even in the context of general regulation (never mind individuated exaction) land·use restriction must 
'substantially advance legitimate state interests,' quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 
(1980) (emphasis added) .... "). 
374. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2000). 
375. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 125 S. Ct. 2074,2077 (2005). 
376. [d. at 2082-83. 
377- [d. at 208fHl7· 
378. [d. at 2087. 
379. [d. at 208fHl7. 
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Dolan is that the property rights movement had hoped to take the Nollan 
and Dolan rationale for heightened means-end analysis and persuade 
courts to apply it far beyond the narrow confines of "dedications of 
property so onerous that, outside the exactions context, they would be 
deemed per se physical takings." They sought to apply them not only to 
all permit exactions, but also to police power regulations of property with 
or without exactions, as in Lingle. 
Coming full circle, Scalia, too, joined with all the other Justices to 
produce a unanimous Court for its repudiation of Agins. The Blackmun 
Papers suggest that Scalia had initially recognized that much of what was 
being dubbed a takings issue was really a question of due process.380 But, 
after expressing those concerns at conference soon after joining the 
Court, he later abandoned them in favor of promoting an aggressive 
reading of the Takings Clause. In Lingle, he appears to have abandoned 
that particular battleground in the takings revolution. Or, as he himself 
put it at oral argument in Lingle, the entire Court, including Scalia, was 
going to "have to eat crow.,,381 
E. SAN REMO HOTEL V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO (2005)382 
The regulatory takings case decided by the Supreme Court after 
Lingle is far from the most important, but it strongly suggests that the 
property rights movement may, at long last, be ridding itself of a 
procedural obstacle to the maintenance of regulatory takings claims. 
Even then, the potential for a later win was embedded in a case that 
property rights advocates lost unanimously in the Court. 
The precise legal issue raised in San Remo Hotel v. City and County 
of San Francisco was not exactly a barn burner: whether an exception to 
issue preclusion should exist under the Full Faith and Credit Clause for 
issues decided in regulatory takings cases that had to be brought first in 
state court because of the Supreme Court's ripeness ruling in Williamson 
County.383 In Williamson County, the Court held in an opinion for the 
Court written by Justice Blackmun that a plaintiff could not maintain a 
section 1983 claim in federal court for a regulatory taking without first 
pursuing any available state court avenues available for just 
compensation.384 The Court's logic in Williamson County was 
straightforward. Unless and until a property owner has been denied just 
compensation potentially available for a regulatory taking in any 
available state administrative or judicial proceeding, there has been no 
380. See supra text accompanying note 241. 
381. Official Oral Argument Transcript at 21, Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, No. 04-163 (Feb. 22, 2005)· 
382. 125 s. Ct. 2491 (2005). 
383. Id. at 2495. 
384. 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
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violation of the federal Constitution's Takings Clause.385 That Clause, 
after all, does not prohibit takings per se; it prohibits takings absent the 
payment of "just compensation." 
The practical effect of the Court's procedural ruiing, however, has 
been harsh on property owners bringing takings challenges who would 
prefer to maintain their lawsuit to vindicate a federal constitutional right 
in federal court.386 If they maintain their federal constitutional claim first 
in state court to satisfy Williamson County ripeness requirements, they 
are precluded from relitigating the same claim in federal court.387 And, if 
they instead seek formally to reserve their federal claim, by bringing only 
a state constitutional takings claim in state court, federal courts 
subsequently hearing their federal constitutional claim may decide to 
reject their federal claim pursuant to issue preclusion and the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause. Issue preclusion can still apply so long as the federal 
and state constitutional takings claims are effectively commensurate. 
Under issue preclusion, when there is no grounds for believing that the 
state constitutional takings issue is any different than a federally based 
one, a state court's rejection of a state constitutional regulatory takings 
claim compels a federal court's similar rejection of a federal takings 
claim.388 
In San Remo, the Court had little trouble unanimously concluding 
that, notwithstanding any possible unfairness caused by denying property 
owners a federal forum for their federal constitutional claim, the 
circumstances did not warrant the Court's making an exception for 
regulatory takings claim under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.389 
Property rights advocates, however, can find some solace in the 
concurring opinion filed in the case by the Chief Justice, joined by 
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.390 Rehnquist's concurring 
opinion stated that the Court should reconsider the correctness of the 
Court's holding in Williamson County that plaintiffs must first seek just 
compensation in available state administrative and judicial fora. 
Rehnquist stated that "further reflection and experience lead me to think 
385. [d. at 194-97. 
386. See San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2507 (Rehnquist, c.J., concurring, joined by O'Connor, Kennedy, 
and Thomas, JJ.). 
387. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981). 
388. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980). 
389. San Remo had the additional complication that the plaintiffs had initially brought the case in 
state court and formally reserved the federal takings claim pursuant to England Y. Louisiana Board of 
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). See San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2501--Q2. The Court, however, 
found the England reservation ineffective because the plaintiffs in state court had not confined their 
litigation to "antecedent state law issues" but instead broadened it by putting forward facial and as-
applied takings claims that, in effect, asked the state court to resolve the same federal issue nominally 
reserved in federal court. [d. at 2503. 
390. San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2507 (Rebnquist, c.J., concurring, joined by O'Connor, Kennedy, and 
Thomas, JJ.). 
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that the justifications for [the Williamson County] state-litigation 
requirement are suspect, while its impact on takings plaintiffs is 
dramatic. ,,39' It was only because the question whether Williamson 
County should be overruled in any respect was not before the Court in 
San Remo-because the parties had not raised it-that the Court did not 
reach the issue. Given the identity of those signing onto the Chief 
Justice's concurring opinion, the possibility seems high of the Court's 
taking the next step to overrule the Williamson County state-litigation 
ripeness requirement in a future case where the issue is raised. For 
reasons unknown, Justice Scalia did not join the Chief Justice's opinion, 
but it seems unlikely that he would not be sympathetic to the Chief 
Justice's views. Now that Chief Justice Roberts has replaced Rehnquist, 
and Justice Alito has replaced Justice O'Connor, the precise status of 
Williamson County is necessarily more murky again. 
CONCLUSION 
Since Justice Scalia joined the Supreme Court in faU 1986, the 
Court's docket has reflected a concerted effort to establish legal 
precedent favoring landowners bringing regulatory takings challenges. 
The Court has decided a large number of significant regulatory takings 
cases and in almost every case but Lingle at the request of the property 
owner who had lost in the court below.392 Notwithstanding the 
opportunity thereby presented, the resulting precedent has plainly been a 
disappointment to property rights advocates. The Court's analytic 
framework for regulatory takings analysis remains today, just as it was in 
1978, Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Penn Central. Justice 
Scalia's effort has largely failed to persuade his colleagues on the Court 
to eschew balancing in favor of a per se approach or heightened means-
end analysis. His first major opinion favoring property rights, Nollan, 
along with the Court's related decision in Dolan, have largely been 
confined to the narrow world of permit exactions of dedications of 
permanent physical easements. So too has Justice Scalia's once landmark 
property rights victory in Lucas largely been whittled away. Almost 
twenty years after Scalia joined the Court, it is now 85-year-old Justice 
Stevens in the majority, while Scalia is mostly relegated to the dissent. 
To the extent, moreover, that takings law has perceptibly shifted 
since the Court's 1978 Penn Central ruling, it has arguably become more 
and not less difficult for regulatory takings plaintiffs to prevail. Once 
courts conclude that Lucas does not apply-either because there is no 
total economic deprivation or, increasingly, because of the existence of 
391. [d. at 250g-1O. 
392. The only other case granted at the request of the government defendant was City of Monterey 
v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
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background principles-they have proven unlikely to find a taking 
instead under the Penn Central framework. The inapplicability of Lucas, 
in effect, saps the force of most takings claims. What Scalia hoped to 
serve as a per se takings rule proves, in its practical operation, to work 
more often as a per se no takings rule. Even Penn Central today is 
potentially less friendly to plaintiffs than when first announced by Justice 
Brennan for the Court in 1978. In light of the Court's recent precedent, 
especially Tahoe-Sierra and Lingle, and opinions of individual Justices 
such as Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Palazzolo and Justice 
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lucas, it seems to have become harder 
for takings plaintiffs to prevail under the reasonable expectations 
analysis carved out by the Court in Penn Centrae93 
What the Blackmun Papers add to the story is how Justice Scalia 
may have appeared an effective champion of pro-property rights rhetoric 
to those outside the Court, but how much less effective he has been so 
far within the Court in furthering that agenda. He not only repeatedly 
failed in his efforts to build a workable coalition on the Court, but he 
also pushed away potential allies. The upshot was, in the first instance, 
precedent heavy on strong rhetoric yet light on staying power. The 
ultimate result was a splintering of those Justices, which included more 
than a simple majority intuitively sympathetic to property rights claims 
and the reconstruction of a new majority more often led by the once 
iconoclastic Justice Stevens. 
To be sure, this Article's thesis is not that Justice Scalia, standing 
alone, caused the faltering of the property rights movement that has 
occurred within the Supreme Court during the past several decades. Of 
course, he did not. There were other forces that played significant, and 
likely even more significant, roles than Scalia himself. Circumstances far 
beyond the control of any individual Justice create the facts of the cases 
that are before the Court and therefore the merits of arguments for and 
against protection of private property rights. So too does the quality of 
the advocacy and the reasoning of the lower court opinions plainly make 
a big difference to the outcome in the Court. 
Yet, the Justices themselves, especially their ability to work within 
the Court, clearly matter too. The general public as well as legal 
commentators typically limit their measure of a Justice on the Court to 
the formal votes he or she publicly declares when the Court announces 
its decision in specific cases. Some of the most important work of a 
Justice, however, is the work each does behind the scenes with other 
members of the Court. It is in private discussions-in individual 
chambers, between chambers, and at conference attended exclusively by 
393. See, e.g., K&K Constr., Inc. v. Mich. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 7fY7 N.W.2d 365 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2005) (rejecting takings claim challenging denial of permit to develop in a wetland). 
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the Justices themselves-when and where a Justice's influence on the 
outcome is truly determined. 
A Justice's formal vote is, of course, significant, but it is not 
ultimately the measure of greatness of a Supreme Court Justice. All 
Justices, including the Chief Justice, have only one vote. To be a great 
Justice requires more than the ability to vote, no matter how intelligent 
those votes. It depends on a Justice's ability to discuss and debate legal 
issues with the other Justices on the Court in a constructive fashion and 
to be persuasive in both oral presentation and written word within the 
Court. By this measure, Justice Scalia has been a disappointment for the 
property rights movement. 
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